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Abstract
We investigate the complexity of approximately counting stable matchings in the
k-attribute model, where the preference lists are determined by dot products of “pref-
erence vectors” with “attribute vectors”, or by Euclidean distances between “prefer-
ence points“ and “attribute points”. Irving and Leather [16] proved that counting
the number of stable matchings in the general case is #P -complete. Counting the
number of stable matchings is reducible to counting the number of downsets in a (re-
lated) partial order [16] and is interreducible, in an approximation-preserving sense,
to a class of problems that includes counting the number of independent sets in a
bipartite graph (#BIS) [7]. It is conjectured that no FPRAS exists for this class
of problems. We show this approximation-preserving interreducibilty remains even
in the restricted k-attribute setting when k ≥ 3 (dot products) or k ≥ 2 (Euclidean
distances). Finally, we show it is easy to count the number of stable matchings in
the 1-attribute dot-product setting.
1 Introduction
1.1 Stable Matchings
The stable matching problem (or stable marriage problem) is a classical combinatorics prob-
lem. An instance of this problem consists of n men and n women, where each man has his
own preference list (a total ordering) of the women, and, similarly, each woman has her
own preference list of the men. A one-to-one pairing of the men with the women is called a
matching (or marriage). Given a matching, if there exists a man M and a woman w in the
matching who prefer each other over their partners in the matching, then the matching is
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considered unstable and the man-woman pair (M,w) is called a blocking pair. (M and w
would prefer to drop their current partners and pair up with each other.) If a matching has
no blocking pairs, then we call it a stable matching. In 1962, Gale and Shapley proved that
every stable matching instance has a stable matching, and described an O(n2) algorithm
for finding one [8].
The stable matching problem has many variants, where ties in the preference lists
could be allowed, where people might have partial preference lists (i.e. someone might
prefer to remain single rather than be paired with certain members of the opposite sex),
generalizations to men/women/pets, universities and applicants, students and projects,
etc. Some of these generalizations have also been well-studied and, indeed, algorithms for
finding stable matchings are used for assigning residents to hospitals in Scotland, Canada,
and the USA [4, 20, 22].
In this paper, we concentrate solely on the classical problem, so the term “matching
instance” will refer to one where the number of men is equal to the number of women, and
each man or women has their own full totally-ordered (i.e. no ties allowed) preference list
for the opposite sex.
Irving and Leather [16] demonstrated that counting the number of stable matchings
for a given instance is #P -complete. This completeness result relies on the connection
between stable marriages and downsets in a related partial order (explained in more detail
in Section 3), as counting the number of downsets in a partial order is another classical
#P -complete problem [21].
Knowing that exactly counting stable matchings is difficult (under standard complexity-
theoretic assumptions), one might turn to methods for approximately counting this number.
In particular, we would like to find a fully-polynomial randomized approximation scheme
(an FPRAS) for this task, i.e. an algorithm that provides an arbitrarily close approxi-
mation in time polynomial in the input size and the desired error — see Section 2 for a
formal definition. One method that has proven successful for other counting problems is
the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method. This technique exploits a relationship
between counting and sampling described by Jerrum, Valiant, and Vazirani [17], namely,
for self-reducible combinatorial structures, the existence of an FPRAS is computationally
equivalent to a polynomial-time algorithm for approximate sampling from the set of struc-
tures. Although the set of stable matchings for an instance does not obviously fit into
the class of self-reducible problems, an efficient algorithm for (approximately) sampling a
random stable matching can be transformed into a method for (approximately) counting
this number.
Bhatnagar, Greenberg, and Randall [1] considered this problem of sampling a random
stable matching using the MCMC method. They examined a natural Markov chain that
uses “male-improving” and “female-improving” rotations (see Section 3.3) to define a ran-
dom walk on the state space of stable matchings for a given instance. In the most general
setting, matching instances can be exhibited for which the mixing time of the random walk
has an exponential lower bound, meaning that it will take an exponential amount of time
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to (approximately) sample a random stable matching. This exponential mixing time is due
to the existence of a “bad cut” in the state space. Bhatnagar, et al. considered several
restricted settings for matching instances and were still able to show instances for which
such a bad cut exists in the state space, implying an exponential mixing time in these
restricted settings.
Of particular interest to us in this paper, Bhatnagar et al. examined the so-called
k-attribute model. In this setting each man and woman has two k-dimensional vectors
associated with them, a “preference” vector and a “position” (or “attribute”) vector. A
man Mi has a preference vector denoted by Mˆi, and a position vector denoted by M¯i
(similarly denoted for the woman wj). Then, Mi prefers wj over wℓ (i.e. wj appears higher
on his preference list than wℓ) if and only if Mˆi · w¯j > Mˆi · w¯ℓ, where Mˆi · w¯j denotes the
usual k-dimensional dot product of vectors. Since we assume that each man has a total
order over the women (and vice-versa), we note that Mˆi · w¯j 6= Mˆi · w¯ℓ whenever j 6= ℓ (and
analogously for the women’s preference vectors/men’s position vectors).
Even in this restricted k-attribute setting (not every matching instance can be rep-
resented in this manner if k is small [3]), Bhatnagar, Greenberg, and Randall were still
able to demonstrate examples of matching instances having a “bad cut” where the Markov
chain has an exponential mixing time. Bhatnagar et al. also considered two other restricted
settings, the so-called k-range and k-list models, but we will not be considering those cases
here. (Again, they gave instances having an exponential mixing time for the Markov chain.)
It must be noted that even though the male-improving/female-improving Markov chain
might have an exponential mixing time, this does not necessarily imply the non-existence
of an FPRAS for the corresponding counting problems. However, Dyer et al. [7] give
evidence suggesting that even approximately counting the number of stable matchings is
itself difficult, i.e. suggesting that an FPRAS may not exist. They do this by demonstrating
approximation-preserving reductions amongst several counting problems, one being that of
counting downsets in a partial order (once again, the connection to stable matchings is
outlined in Section 3). Relevant background about approximation-preserving reductions
is discussed in Section 2. The main point is that the existence of an FPRAS for one
problem would imply the existence of an FPRAS for this entire class of counting problems.
Currently, the existence of such an FPRAS remains an open question.
It is precisely the goal of this paper to consider the complexity of the approximate
counting problem for the k-attribute model.
Before we continue, let us formally define some counting problems. Two counting
problems relevant to us are:
Name: #SM .
Instance: A stable matching instance with n men and n women.
Output: The number of stable matchings.
Name: #SM(k-attribute).
Instance: A stable matching instance with n men and n women in the k-attribute setting,
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i.e. preference lists are determined using dot products between k-dimensional preference
and position vectors as mentioned above.
Output: The number of stable matchings.
As we stated previously, if k is small (relative to n), there exist preference lists that
are not realizable in the k-attribute setting [3]. On the other hand, if k = n then we can
clearly represent any set of n preference lists by simply using a separate coordinate for
each person to rank the members of the opposite sex.
Another counting problem we consider in this paper is the following one:
Name: #SM(k-Euclidean).
Instance: A stable matching instance with n men and n women in the k-dimensional
Euclidean setting. In this setting, men and women each have a “preference point” and
“position point”. Preference lists are determined using Euclidean distances between pref-
erence points and position points.
Output: The number of stable matchings.
In other words, for a k-Euclidean stable matching instance man Mi prefers woman wj
to woman wℓ if and only if d(Mˆi, w¯j) < d(Mˆi, w¯ℓ), where d(x, y) is the Euclidean distance
between points x and y. Once again, ties are not allowed in the preference lists.
Before we describe our results, let us give a brief introduction to approximation-
preserving (AP) reductions and AP-reducibility. Further details can be found in Section 2.
1.2 AP-reducibility (a brief introduction)
Approximate counting problems have been of increasing interest in recent years. Some suc-
cess has been demonstrated by finding fully-polynomial randomized approximation schemes
for some #P -complete problems. Likewise, there are some (but fewer) problems known to
not admit an FPRAS under usual complexity-theoretic assumptions.
AP-reducibility (for approximation-preserving reducibility) is similar in nature to re-
ductions used in showing problems are NP -complete. Broadly speaking, if g is an integer-
valued function (that counts some type of combinatorial structure) and there is an
approximation-preserving reduction from another integer-valued function f (counting some-
thing else) to g, then an FPRAS for g gives us an FPRAS for f . (Similar to Turing reduc-
tions, the problem sizes are polynomially related and the error terms of the approximations
are also polynomially related.) In this case we would write f ≤AP g to mean that f has
an AP-reduction to g. Similarly we write f ≡AP g to mean that f ≤AP g and g ≤AP f , or
that f and g are AP-interreducible. Definitions are provided in Section 2.
This kind of AP-reduction allows us to study the relative complexity of approximate
counting problems, just as polynomial many-one reductions allow us to compare complexity
of decision problems such as graph coloring and satisfiability.
The complexity class #RHΠ1 of counting problems was introduced by Dyer, Goldberg,
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Greenhill and Jerrum [7] as a means to classify a wide class of approximate counting
problems that were previously of indeterminate computational complexity. The problems
in #RHΠ1 are those that can be expressed in terms of counting the number of models of a
logical formula from a certain syntactically restricted class. Although the authors were not
aware of it at the time, this syntactically restricted class had already been studied under
the title “restricted Krom SNP” [5]. The complexity class #RHΠ1 has a completeness
class (with respect to AP-reductions) which includes a wide and ever-increasing range of
natural counting problems, including: independent sets in a bipartite graph, downsets in
a partial order, configurations in the Widom-Rowlinson model (all [7]) and the partition
function of the ferromagnetic Ising model with mixed external field [10]. Either all of these
problems have an FPRAS, or none do. No FPRAS is currently known for any of them,
despite much effort having been expended on finding one.
All the problems in the completeness class mentioned above are inter-reducible via AP-
reductions, so any of them could be said to exemplify the completeness class. However,
mainly for historical reasons, the following problem tends to be taken as a key example
in the class, much in the same way that Sat has a privileged status in the theory on
NP-completeness.
Name: #BIS.
Instance: A bipartite graph B.
Output: The number of independent sets in B.
Ge and Sˇtefankovicˇ [9] recently proposed an interesting new MCMC algorithm for sam-
pling independent sets in bipartite graphs. Unfortunately, however, the relevant Markov
chain mixes slowly [12] so even this interesting new idea does not give an FPRAS for
#BIS. In fact, Goldberg and Jerrum [11] conjecture that no FPRAS exists for #BIS (or
for the other problems in the completeness class). We make this conjecture on empirical
grounds, namely that the problem has survived its first decade despite considerable efforts
to find an FPRAS and the collection of known #BIS-equivalent problems is growing.
Since Dyer et al. show that #BIS and counting downsets are both complete in this
class, and it is known that counting downsets is equivalent to counting stable matchings,
the result of Dyer et al. implies #BIS ≡AP #SM .
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate AP-interreducibility of #BIS with the two
restricted stable matching problems defined in Section 1.1.
1.3 Our results
In this paper we prove the following results:
Theorem 1 #BIS ≡AP #SM(k−attribute) when k ≥ 3.
In other words, #BIS is AP-interreducible with counting stable matchings in the k-
attribute setting when k ≥ 3, so this problem is equivalent in terms of approximability to
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the complete problems in the complexity class #RHΠ1.
Theorem 2 #SM(1−attribute) is solvable in polynomial time.
We can also prove AP-interreducibility with #BIS in the k-Euclidean setting (when
k ≥ 2) in a similar manner. Recall that in the k-Euclidean setting, preference lists are
determined by (closest) Euclidean distances between the “preference points” and “position
points”.
Theorem 3 #BIS ≡AP #SM(k−Euclidean) when k ≥ 2.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows:
We review further background on approximation schemes and AP-reductions in Sec-
tion 2.
Section 3 reviews some combinatorics of the stable matching problem that is relevant
for our purposes in this paper.
Section 4 demonstrates Theorem 1 and Section 5 is devoted to proving Theorem 2.
We give the construction required to demonstrate Theorem 3 in Section 6. This con-
struction ends up giving us identical preference lists as those for the k-attribute (k ≥ 3)
model. Thus, the remainder of the proof to show AP-interreducibility between
#SM(k-Euclidean) for k ≥ 2 and #BIS is identical to that for the 3-attribute setting and
is not repeated.
2 Randomized Approximation Schemes and
Approximation-preserving reductions
A randomized approximation scheme is an algorithm for approximately computing the
value of a function f : Σ∗ → R. The approximation scheme has a parameter ε > 0 which
specifies the error tolerance. A randomized approximation scheme for f is a randomized
algorithm that takes as input an instance x ∈ Σ∗ (e.g., for the problem #SM , the input
would be an encoding of a stable matching instance) and a rational error tolerance ε > 0,
and outputs a rational number z (a random variable of the “coin tosses” made by the
algorithm) such that, for every instance x,
Pr
[
e−ǫf(x) ≤ z ≤ eǫf(x)
]
≥
3
4
. (1)
The randomized approximation scheme is said to be a fully polynomial randomized approx-
imation scheme, or FPRAS, if it runs in time bounded by a polynomial in |x| and ǫ−1.
Note that the quantity 3/4 in Equation (1) could be changed to any value in the open
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interval (1
2
, 1) without changing the set of problems that have randomized approximation
schemes [17, Lemma 6.1].
We now define the notion of an approximation-preserving (AP) reduction. Suppose
that f and g are functions from Σ∗ to R. As mentioned before, an AP-reduction from f
to g gives a way to turn an FPRAS for g into an FPRAS for f . Here is the formal
definition. An approximation-preserving reduction from f to g is a randomized algorithmA
for computing f using an oracle for g. The algorithm A takes as input a pair (x, ε) ∈
Σ∗ × (0, 1), and satisfies the following three conditions: (i) every oracle call made by A
is of the form (w, δ), where w ∈ Σ∗ is an instance of g, and 0 < δ < 1 is an error bound
satisfying δ−1 ≤ poly(|x|, ε−1); (ii) the algorithm A meets the specification for being a
randomized approximation scheme for f (as described above) whenever the oracle meets
the specification for being a randomized approximation scheme for g; and (iii) the run-time
of A is polynomial in |x| and ε−1.
According to the definition, approximation-preserving reductions may use randomiza-
tion and may make multiple oracle calls. Nevertheless, the reductions that we present in
this paper are deterministic. Each reduction makes a single oracle call (with δ = ǫ) and re-
turns the result of that oracle call. A word of warning about terminology: Subsequent to [7],
the notation ≤AP has been used to denote a different type of approximation-preserving re-
duction which applies to optimization problems. We will not study optimization problems
in this paper, so hopefully this will not cause confusion.
3 Combinatorics of the stable matching problem
The (classical) stable matching problem has a rich combinatorial structure which has been
widely studied. We relate some aspects of this structure that we will need in this paper.
Many of the definitions and results that follow can be found, for example, in [18, 16, 14, 13].
3.1 The Gale-Shapley algorithm
In their seminal paper on the stable matching problem, Gale and Shapley [8] gave a
polynomial-time algorithm for constructing a stable matching. This is generally referred
to as the “proposal algorithm” and bears the names of Gale and Shapley in all of the
literature on stable matchings. One sex (typically the men) make proposals to members
of the other, forming “engagements”. Once all the “proposers” are engaged, the algorithm
terminates with a stable matching.
A description of this algorithm follows.
As noted by Gale and Shapley (and others), the above algorithm computes the male-
optimal stable matching, which is optimal in the very strong sense that every man likes
his partner in this matching at least as much as his partner in any other stable matching.
Given an instance with n men and n women, the algorithm computes the male-optimal
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Algorithm 1 Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Initially every man and every woman is free.
• Repeat until all men are engaged:
• A free man M proposes to w, the highest woman on his list who has not already
rejected him.
– If w is free, then she accepts the proposal and M and w become engaged.
– If w is engaged to M ′, then
∗ Let M+ be the favorite of w between men M and M ′.
∗ Let M− be the least favorite of w between men M and M ′.
∗ M+ and w become engaged to each other.
∗ w rejects M− and M− is set free.
stable matching in time O(n2).
During the algorithm, after a woman becomes “engaged” she never becomes free, though
she might be engaged to different men at different times during the execution of the algo-
rithm. On the other hand, a man could oscillate between being free and being engaged.
It is well-known (see, e.g. [8, 18]) that the male-optimal matching may be obtained by
taking any ordering of the men and have them make proposals in that order, i.e. when “a
free man M proposes...” we can take the highest free man in our ordering of the men to
perform the next proposal.
By reversing the roles of men and women (i.e. the women are the “proposers”), we can
obtain the female-optimal stable matching.
3.2 Stable matching lattice
Given a matching instance and two stable matchings M and M′ where
M = {(M1, w1), (M2, w2), · · · , (Mn, wn)},
M′ = {(M ′1, w1), (M
′
2, w2), · · · , (M
′
n, wn)},
we define max{Mi,M
′
i}, min{Mi,M
′
i}, max{M,M
′} and min{M,M′} as follows:
max{Mi,M
′
i} = favorite choice of woman wi between men Mi and M
′
i
min{Mi,M
′
i} = least preferred choice of woman wi between men Mi and M
′
i
max{M,M′} = {(max{M1,M
′
1}, w1), (max{M2,M
′
2}, w2), · · · , (max{Mn,M
′
n}, wn)}
min{M,M′} = {(min{M1,M
′
1}, w1), (min{M2,M
′
2}, w2), · · · , (min{Mn,M
′
n}, wn)}
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Note that in the expression max{Mi,M
′
i}, the woman wi can deduced from the argu-
ments since she is the only woman married to Mi in M and in M
′
i in M
′. From [18],
we have that max{M,M′} and min{M,M′} are themselves stable matchings. Further,
we define the relation M ≤ M′ if and only if M′ = max{M,M′}. It is clear that the
relation ≤ is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive. Hence, the stable matchings of a
stable matching instance form a lattice under the ≤ relation.
In fact, this lattice is a distributive lattice under the “max” and “min” operations
defined above [18]. The male-optimal matching is the minimum element in this lattice
(under the ≤ relation), while the female-optimal matching is the maximum element.
It is well-known (see, for instance, [6]) that a finite distributive lattice is isomorphic
to the lattice of downsets of another partial order (ordered by subset inclusion). We shall
shortly see how this other downset lattice arises in the context of stable matchings, and
its connection to the stable matching lattice.
3.3 Stable pairs and rotations
Definition 3.1 A pair (M,w) is called stable if and only if (M,w) is a pair in some stable
matching M. A pair (M,w) that is not stable is called an unstable pair.
Definition 3.2 Let M be a stable matching. For any man M (woman w), let spM(M)
(spM(w)) denote the spouse of man M (woman w) in the matching M.
Definition 3.3 [1] Let M be a stable matching. The suitor of a man M is defined to be
the first woman w on M ’s preference list such that (i) M prefers his spouse over w and
(ii) w prefers M over her spouse. The suitor of man M is denoted by SM(M).
We note that SM(M) may not exist for every man. For instance, if M is the female-
optimal stable matching, then SM(M) would not exist.
Definition 3.4 [16] Let M be a stable matching. Let R = {(M0, w0), (M1, w1), · · · ,
(Mk−1, wk−1)} be an ordered list of pairs from M such that for every i, 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
SM(Mi) is wi+1(mod k). Then R is a rotation (exposed in the matching M).
A stable matching may have many or no exposed rotations. Applying an exposed
rotation to a stable matching (i.e. breaking the pairs (Mi, wi) and forming the new pairs
(Mi, wi+1)) gives a new stable matching in which the women are “happier” and the men
are less happy. In other words, after a rotation, every woman (respectively, man) involved
in the rotation is married to someone higher (resp. lower) on her (resp. his) preference list
than her (resp. his) partner in the rotation.
We can similarly define suitors for the women, given some stable matching M. We do
not need to do so for the purposes of this paper, but the Markov chain that Bhatnagar,
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et al. examine in [1] consists of moves that are “male-improving” and “female-improving”
rotations. Starting from any stable matching, it is possible to obtain any other stable
matching using some (appropriately chosen) sequence of male-improving and/or female-
improving rotations [16].
Definition 3.5 [13] A pair (M,w), not necessarily stable, is said to be eliminated by the
rotation R if R moves w from M or below on her preference list to a man strictly above
M .
Note that if a stable pair (M,w) in a rotation R is eliminated by R, and if (M,w′) is
any other pair eliminated by R, then man M prefers w over w′, for otherwise no matching
that has R exposed in it could be stable.
Lemma 4 [16] No pair is eliminated by more than one rotation, and for any pair (M,w),
at most one rotation moves M to w.
We can now define a relation on rotations.
Definition 3.6 [16] Let R and R′ be two distinct rotations. Rotation R is said to explicitly
precede R′ if and only if R eliminates a pair (M,w), and R′ moves M to a woman w′ such
that M (strictly) prefers w to w′. The relation “precedes” is defined as the transitive closure
of the “explicitly precedes” relation.
If a rotation R explicitly precedes R′ then there is no stable matching with R′ exposed
such that applying R′ results in a stable matching with R exposed — the intermediate
matching would have a blocking pair (hence would not be stable). The relation precedes
(≤) defines a partial order on the set of rotations of the stable matching instance. We call
the partial order on the set of rotations the rotation poset of the instance and denote it
(P,≤).
The following theorem relates the rotations in the rotation poset to the stable matchings
of the instance via the downsets of P .
Theorem 5 [16, Theorem 4.1] For any stable matching instance, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the stable matchings of that instance and the downsets of its rota-
tion poset.
Every stable matching of the instance can be obtained by starting with the male-optimal
stable matching and performing the rotations in the corresponding downset (ensuring that
a rotation is performed before any rotation that succeeds it is performed). Note that the
downsets corresponding to the male-optimal stable matching and the female-optimal stable
matching are ∅ and P , respectively.
To construct the rotation poset, we need (i) the rotations and (ii) the precedence re-
lations between them. We note that once we have all the rotations in the poset, we can
establish the precedence relations using the “explicitly precedes” relation, i.e. by determin-
ing which (stable or unstable) pairs are eliminated by each rotation.
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3.4 Gusfield’s algorithm for finding all rotations
Given a stable matching instance, let H be the Hasse diagram of the stable matching
lattice defined in Section 3.2. That is, H is the transitive reduction of the relation ≤ on
the set of stable matchings. Gusfield [13] gave a fast algorithm for finding all rotations of
a stable matching instance. His algorithm is a refinement of successive applications of the
“breakmarriage” procedure of McVitie and Wilson [19]. The key ingredient in Gusfield’s
proof that his algorithm is correct is the following.
Theorem 6 [13, Theorem 6] Let Φ be any path in H from the male-optimal stable match-
ing to the female-optimal stable matching. Then any two consecutive matchings on Φ differ
by a single rotation, and the set of all rotations between matchings along Φ contains every
rotation exactly once.
Gusfield presented a well-tuned version of his algorithm that runs in O(n2) time. For
the sake of presentation, we use the following, slower, variant of his algorithm (the variant
still runs in polynomial time, which suffices for our purposes).
Algorithm 2 Find-All-Rotations Algorithm
• Initially we start with the male-optimal stable matching M0, and some ordering of
the men.
• In the current matching Mi, among the ordered men, pick the first man who has
a suitor. (If there are no men that have a suitor, then Mi is the female-optimal
matching and the algorithm stops.) Let man M1 be the first man who has a suitor,
namely SMi(M1).
• Start constructing the sequence (M1, w1), (M2, w2), · · · where w1 = spMi(M1), for
l = 2, 3, · · · , wl = SMi(Ml−1) and Ml = spMi(wl).
• If there exists a t ∈ {1, · · · , l − 1} such that wt = wl, then return the rotation
(Mt, wt), · · · , (Ml, wl), and apply the rotation to Mi to get a new stable matching
Mi+1. Otherwise, increment l and continue constructing the sequence.
In Algorithm 2, the existence of t is guaranteed by the fact that the current stable
matching Mi is different from the female-optimal stable matching and, hence, has a rota-
tion exposed in it. The correctness of the algorithm follows from Theorem 6: Starting at
Mi, the algorithm applies a rotation to obtain Mi+1. Since rotations improve the utility
of the women involved,Mi+1 ≥Mi. To apply Theorem 6 we need only argue that the step
from Mi to Mi+1 is a single step in H rather than multiple steps. Equivalently, we need
to argue that the rotation between Mi and Mi+1 cannot be decomposed as a sequence
of smaller rotations (where these smaller rotations correspond to individual steps in H).
This follows by the definition of “suitor” — if Mi has rotation R exposed and applying
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rotation R yields a stable matchingM′ with R′ exposed and applying R′ yieldsMi+1 then
either R and R′ are disjoint (contradicting the fact that the transformation from Mi to
Mi+1 can be accomplished with a single rotation) or R and R
′ share a man (in which case
the transformation from Mi to Mi+1 does not move this man to his suitor in Mi, so is
not a rotation).
Once we find all of the rotations using Algorithm 2, we can order them to find the
rotation poset P using the relation given in Definition 3.6.
3.5 #BIS, independent sets, and stable matchings
The rotation poset for a matching instance plays a key role in what follows. To prove
Theorem 1, we take a #BIS instance G = (V1 ∪V2, E) and view this as the rotation poset
of a matching instance. In particular, G is the Hasse diagram of the poset when we draw
G with the set V2 “above” V1.
Each independent set in the bipartite graph naturally corresponds to a downset in the
partial order, and vice-versa. See Figure 1 for an example. An independent set, namely
{d, f, g}, is shown in the left of that figure. The corresponding downset is shown on the
right. This downset is obtained by taking the set {d, f, g} and adding the two elements a
and b, as a < f and b < f (and b < g) in the Hasse diagram. Conversely, given a downset,
a b c d
f g h i j
a b c d
f g h i j
V2
V1
Figure 1: The correspondence between independent sets and downsets
such as the one on the right of the diagram, we can find the corresponding independent
set in G by taking the set of maximal elements of the downset.
So given G, we then construct a matching instance (using 3-dimensional preference
and attribute vectors) whose rotation poset is (isomorphic to) G, giving a 1-1 correspon-
dence for our AP-reduction from #BIS to #SM(k-attribute), showing that #BIS ≤AP
#SM(k-attribute). This construction, and the proof of the correspondence, is in Section 4.
The reverse implication #SM(k-attribute) ≤AP #BIS follows from the two results that
#SM ≤AP #Downsets (Theorem 5, quoted here from [16]) and #Downsets ≤ #BIS [7,
Lemma 9], where #Downsets is the problem of counting the number of downsets in a
partial order.
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4 Stable matchings in the k-attribute model (k ≥ 3)
In this section we give our construction to show AP-reducibility from #BIS to the k-
attribute stable matching model when k ≥ 3.
Given our previous remarks about the relation between #BIS, independent sets, and
stable matchings, our procedure is as follows:
1. Let G = (V1 ∪ V2, E) denote a bipartite graph where |E| = n. Our goal will be to
construct a k-attribute stable matching instance for which we can show that the Hasse
diagram of its rotation poset is G. This will give a bijection between stable matchings
and downsets of G, hence a bijection between stable matchings and independent sets
of G.
2. Using G, in the manner to be specified in Section 4.1, we construct preference lists
for a 3-attribute stable matching instance with 3n men and 3n women.
3. Given this matching instance, we find the male-optimal and female-optimal match-
ings.
4. Using the Find-All-Rotations algorithm, we extract the rotations from our stable
matching instance.
5. Having these rotations, we construct the partial order, P , on these rotations (specified
by the transitive closure of the “explicitly precedes” relation).
6. We finally show that P is isomorphic to G (when G is viewed as a partial order),
thereby showing our construction is an approximation-preserving reduction from
#BIS to #SM(3−attribute).
4.1 Construction of the stable matching instance
4.1.1 BIS and permutations
Let G = (V1 ∪ V2, E) denote our BIS instance, where E ⊆ V1 × V2 and |E| = n.
Using G we will construct a 3-attribute stable matching instance with 3n men and 3n
women. The men and women of the instance are denoted {A1, . . . , An, B1, . . . , Bn, C1, . . . ,
Cn} and {a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn, c1, . . . , cn}, respectively. To describe our construction, we
label the edges of G B1 through Bn from “left-to-right” with respect to the vertices (V1)
on the bottom. This becomes more clear from the example in Figure 2. We refer to edge
Bi as man Bi, and this will be clear from the context.
For our construction we associate two permutations, ρ and σ, of [n] = {1, . . . , n} with
the BIS instance. The cycles of ρ correspond to vertices in V1 and those of σ correspond to
vertices in V2. In other words, if the edges incident to a vertex in V2 are Bi1, Bi2 , . . . , Bid,
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Figure 2: A BIS instance and our labeling of its edges
then (i1, i2, . . . , id) is a σ-cycle. We define ρ-cycles in a similar fashion. If G has k = |V1|
vertices on the bottom and l = |V2| vertices on the top, then the permutations ρ and σ
have k and l cycles, respectively. Since the graph G will turn out to be isomorphic to a
rotation poset, every vertex in G will represent a rotation in the stable matching instance.
The rotations of the stable matching instance will be governed by the ρ- and σ-cycles
in a manner to be specified. The rotations corresponding to the ρ-cycles will be called
ρ-rotations and those corresponding to the σ-cycles will be called σ-rotations.
In the example of Figure 2, the three ρ-cycles are ρ1 = (1, 2, 3), ρ2 = (4, 5, 6), and
ρ3 = (7, 8). The four σ-cycles are σ1 = (1, 7), σ2 = (2, 4), σ3 = (5), and σ4 = (3, 6, 8).
Here is a brief overview of how we go about constructing a stable matching instance
from a given bipartite graph.
First of all, the male-optimal stable matching in our matching instance we construct
will consist of the pairs (Ai, ai), (Bi, bi), (Ci, ci) for all i ∈ [n]. (We must show later this is
indeed the case for the construction we describe.)
A ρ-cycle of the form (i1, i1+1, . . . , i2) will correspond to the ρ-rotation, R, of the form
{(Bi1 , bi1), (Ai1 , ai1), (Bi1+1, bi1+1), (Ai1+1, ai1+1), . . . , (Bi2, bi2), (Ai2 , ai2)}.
This rotation R arises from a vertex v ∈ V1 with edges Bi1 , Bi1+1, . . . , Bi2 incident to it.
We will later show that a σ-rotation R′ is of the form
{(Bi1 , ai1), (Ci1, ci1), (Bi2 , ai2), (Ci2 , ci2), . . . , (Bip, aip), (Cip, cip)},
where (i1, i2, . . . , ip) is the corresponding σ-cycle, and that the rotation R
′ corresponds to
the vertex v′ ∈ V2 with edges Bi1 , Bi2, . . . , Bip incident to it.
In this manner, every rotation in the rotation poset is defined in terms of the men
involved in them, the women being the (then-current) partners of the men that are in the
rotation. Assuming that the above two claims regarding rotations are valid (as we will
show below), we make the following observation.
Observation 7 A ρ-cycle and a σ-cycle can have at most one element in common. (This
is because G is a graph and not a multi-graph.) This means that a ρ-rotation and a σ-
rotation can have at most one man in common. This similarly holds for the women.
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In the next section we start by assigning preference vectors and position vectors to
the men and women in our stable matching instance. Following that, we construct the
initial portion of their preference lists. We then find the male- and the female-optimal
matchings using the Gale-Shapley algorithm. After finding the male- and the female-
optimal matchings, we extract all the rotations of the rotation poset using the Find-All-
Rotations algorithm. Finally, we obtain the rotation poset by ordering rotations using
the explicitly precedes relation. As we stated earlier, we will find this rotation poset is
isomorphic to G, showing our construction is a mapping from the set of #BIS instances
to #SM(3-attribute) instances.
4.1.2 Assigning preference and position vectors
Suppose D1, . . . , Dl are the l cycles of σ of lengths p1, . . . , pl, respectively. Let ei be a
representative element of cycle Di. In other words, we can represent the σ-cycle Di as
Di = (ei, σ(ei), . . . , σ
pi−1(ei)). (We may, for example, select ei to be the smallest number
in the cycle, and we will do so here). In what follows we will often abbreviate σx =
σ(x), σ2x = σ2(x), σ−1x = σ−1(x), etc, and, similarly, ρx = ρ(x), etc.
Let Rep(σ) = {e1, e2 · · · , el} be the set of representative elements we choose for the
cycles of σ. Let Wi = {ax : x ∈ Di} ∪ {bρx : x ∈ Di} ∪ {cσ−1x : x ∈ Di}. Let T (x) =
{cσ−1x, ax, bρx} where x ∈ Di. It follows that Wi = ∪x∈DiT (x) and T (i) ∩ T (j) = ∅ for
i 6= j.
Using the definitions above, we begin to create a stable matching instance in the 3-
attribute model whose rotation poset is the graph G. As a reminder, every man, say Ai,
is associated with two vectors: (i) a position vector denoted by A¯i, and (ii) a preference
vector denoted by Aˆi. Every woman similarly has her own position and preference vectors.
Each man ranks the women based on the dot product of his preference vector with their
position vectors. In other words, if Aˆi · b¯ > Aˆi · c¯, then man Ai prefers woman b over c.
Note that we can always assign preference vectors so that |Aˆi| = 1 (by normalizing those
vectors).
Our task, therefore, is to specify the position and preference vectors for all the men
and women in our matching instance.
First we fix the position vectors of the women. The z-coordinate of women ai and ci is
set to 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The z-coordinate of woman bi is set to 4
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The x-
and y-coordinates of ai, bi, and ci are such that the projection of each women’s position
vector onto the x-y plane lies on the unit circle x2 + y2 = 1. Furthermore, we group the
projections according to the sets Wi. In other words, all women in Wi are embedded in
an angle of ǫ on the unit circle, where ǫ = 2π/n2. These groups are embedded around the
circle in the orderW1 throughWl, and the angle between two adjacent groups is (2π−lǫ)/l.
Note that Wl is adjacent to Wl−1 and W1. Group Wi starts at angle 2π(i− 1)/l and ends
at 2π(i− 1)/l + ǫ.
15
Within the group Wi, the women are further sub-grouped into triplets
T (ei), T (σ(ei)), . . . , T (σ
pi−1(ei)).
Within the angle of size ǫ, the sub-groups are embedded in the order T (ei) through
T (σpi−1(ei)), with each T (·) spanning an angle of 6θi. The angle between two adjacent
x
y
W1
W2
W3
Wl
Arrange (projections of) position
vectors for each Wi inside the sec-
tors shown
x
y
c¯σ−1ei
a¯ei
b¯ρei
b¯ρσpi−1ei
Cˆσ−1ei
Aˆei
(parallel to proj(Bˆei))
Zoom-in on one of the Wi,
showing the women’s posi-
tion vectors and men’s pref-
erence vectors
Figure 3: Placement of the women’s position vectors and men’s preference vectors
T (·)’s is θi, where θi = ǫ/(7pi − 1). Within each T (x), the women appear in the order
cσ−1x, ax, and bρx, and the angle between c¯σ−1x and a¯x is 4θi, and the angle between a¯x and
b¯ρx is 2θi. We summarize the above description by giving the exact coordinates for the
position vector for the women.
Let ǫ =
2π
n2
.
For ei ∈ Rep(σ), let θi = ǫ/(7pi − 1). Then for 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1 define
a¯σmei = (cos(2π(i− 1)/l + 7mθi + 4θi), sin(2π(i− 1)/l + 7mθi + 4θi), 0) ,
b¯ρσmei = (cos(2π(i− 1)/l + 7mθi + 6θi), sin(2π(i− 1)/l + 7mθi + 6θi), 4
ρσmei), and
c¯σm−1ei = (cos(2π(i− 1)/l + 7mθi), sin(2π(i− 1)/l + 7mθi), 0) .
Next we define the preference vectors of the men. The z-coordinates of all Aˆi and Cˆi
are set to 0. We place Aˆi between a¯i and the projection onto the x-y plane of b¯ρi. If the
angle between a¯i and (the projection of) b¯ρi is α, then the angle between a¯i and Aˆi is
1
3
α,
and the angle between Aˆi and (the projection of) b¯ρi is
2
3
α. This will ensure that Ai prefers
ai over bρi. We will later show that the preference list of Ai starts with aibρi. We place Cˆi
between c¯i and a¯σi such that if the angle between c¯i and a¯σi is β, then the angle between
c¯i and Cˆi is
2
5
β and the angle between Cˆi and a¯σi is
3
5
β. This will ensure that Ci prefers ci
over aσi. We will later show that the preference list of Ci starts with ciaσi.
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Finally, we place Bˆi, which is of unit length, such that Bˆi makes an angle of φ = 2π/100
with the vertical axis (z-axis) and its projection on the x-y plane is parallel to a¯i. In other
words, the projection of Bˆi on the z = 0 plane is sin φ a¯i. We summarize the above
discussion by providing the exact coordinates of Aˆi, Bˆi, and Cˆi.
Let φ = 2π/100 and ǫ =
2π
n2
.
For ei ∈ Rep(σ), let θi = ǫ/(7pi − 1). Then for 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1 define
Aˆσmei = (cos(2π(i− 1)/l + 7mθi + (14/3)θi), sin(2π(i− 1)/l + 7mθi + (14/3)θi), 0) ,
Bˆσmei = (sinφ cos(2π(i− 1)/l + 7mθi + 4θi), sinφ sin(2π(i− 1)/l + 7mθi + 4θi), cosφ),
and
Cˆσm−1ei = (cos(2π(i− 1)/l + 7mθi + (8/5)θi), sin(2π(i− 1)/l + 7mθi + (8/5)θi), 0) .
In Section 4.1.3 we establish the preference lists of the men and women. The vectors
given above let us determine the preference lists of the men, so we now specify the position
vectors of the men and the preference vectors of the women. This proceeds in a similar
manner as above.
Suppose E1 through Ek are the k cycles of ρ of lengths q1 through qk, respectively. As
above, let fi be a representative element of cycle Ei, so that we can write the ρ-cycle as
(fi, ρ(fi), . . . , ρ
qi−1(fi)). Let Rep(ρ) = {f1, f2 · · · , fk} be the set of representative elements
we select for the cycles of ρ. Let Ui = {Aρ−1r : r ∈ Ei}∪{Br : r ∈ Ei}∪{Cr : r ∈ Ei}. Let
S(r) = {Aρ−1r, Br, Cr} where r ∈ Ei. It follows that Ui = ∪r∈EiS(r) and S(i) ∩ S(j) = ∅
for i 6= j.
We fix the position vectors of the men. The placement of the men is similar to that
of the women. The z-coordinate of the men Ai and Bi is set to 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The
z-coordinate of man Ci is set to 4
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The x- and y-coordinates of Ai, Bi and
Ci are such that the projection of the men onto the z = 0 plane lies on the unit circle
x2 + y2 = 1. Similar to above, the projections are grouped according to the sets Ui. In
other words, with ǫ = 2π/n2, all men in Ui are embedded in an angle of ǫ on the unit
circle. The groups are embedded around the circle in the order U1 through Uk and the
angle between two adjacent groups is (2π − kǫ)/k. Note that Uk is adjacent to Uk−1 and
U1. The group Ui starts at angle 2π(i − 1)/k and ends at 2π(i − 1)/k + ǫ. Within the
group Ui, the men are further sub-grouped into triplets S(fi), S(ρ(fi)), · · · , S(ρ
qi−1(fi)).
Within the angle of ǫ, the sub-groups are embedded in the order S(fi) through S(ρ
qi−1(fi))
with each S(·) spanning an angle of 6ωi, where the angle between two adjacent S(·)’s is
ωi = ǫ/(7qi− 1). Within each S(j), the men appear in the order Aρ−1j , Bj and Cj, and the
angle between A¯ρ−1j and B¯j is 4ωi and the angle between B¯j and C¯j is 2ωi. Here are the
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exact co-ordinates for the position vector of each man.
Let ǫ =
2π
n2
.
For fi ∈ Rep(ρ), let ωi = ǫ/(7qi − 1). Then for 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1 we define
A¯ρm−1fi = (cos(2π(i− 1)/k + 7mωi), sin(2π(i− 1)/k + 7mωi), 0) ,
B¯ρmfi = (cos(2π(i− 1)/k + 7mωi + 4ωi), sin(2π(i− 1)/k + 7mωi + 4ωi), 0) , and
C¯ρmfi = (cos(2π(i− 1)/k + 7mωi + 6ωi), sin(2π(i− 1)/k + 7mωi + 6ωi), 4
ρmfi).
Finally, we define the preference vectors of the women. The z-coordinates of bˆi and cˆi
are set to 0. Suppose the angle between B¯i and (the projection onto the x-y plane of) C¯i
is α. Then we place cˆi in the x-y plane between B¯i and (the projection of) C¯i such that
the angle between B¯i and cˆi is
1
3
α, and the angle between cˆi and (the projection of) C¯i is
2
3
α. We place bˆi between A¯ρ−1i and B¯i such that if the angle between A¯ρ−1i and B¯i is β,
then the angle between A¯ρ−1i and bˆi is
2
5
β and the angle between bˆi and B¯i is
3
5
β.
We place aˆi, which is of unit length, such that aˆi makes an angle of φ = 2π/100 with
the vertical axis (z-axis) and its projection on the z = 0 plane is parallel to B¯i. In other
words, the projection of aˆi on the z = 0 plane is sinφ B¯i. Therefore, the exact coordinates
of the preference vectors cˆi, aˆi and bˆi are as follows.
Let φ = 2π/100 and ǫ =
2π
n2
.
For fi ∈ Rep(ρ), let ωi = ǫ/(7qi − 1). Then for 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1 we define
aˆρmfi = (sin φ cos(2π(i− 1)/k + 7mωi + 4ωi), sinφ sin(2π(i− 1)/k + 7mωi + 4ωi), cosφ),
bˆρmfi = (cos(2π(i− 1)/k + 7mωi + (8/5)ωi), sin(2π(i− 1)/k + 7mωi + 8/5ωi), 0) , and
cˆρmfi = (cos(2π(i− 1)/k + 7mωi + 14/3ωi), sin(2π(i− 1)/k + 7mωi + (14/3)ωi), 0) .
4.1.3 Constructing (partial) preference lists
Using the vectors defined in the previous section, we now examine the preference lists of
the men and women of our constructed instance.
First we will establish that the preference lists of Ai and Ci start with aibρi and ciaσi,
respectively. Since Aˆi and Cˆi have a z-component that is equal to zero, it is enough to
consider the projections of a¯i, b¯i and c¯i on the x-y plane. Furthermore, since Aˆi, Cˆi, and the
projections of a¯i, b¯i and c¯i are all of unit length, the dot product is essentially a function of
the angle between the two vectors. In other words, if the angle between Aˆi and b¯ is greater
than the angle between Aˆi and c¯, then Aˆi · b¯ < Aˆi · c¯. Recalling that Aˆi lies between a¯i and
b¯ρi, and is closer to a¯i, then ai will appear first on the preference list of Ai. The women
positioned next to ai on the unit circle are bρi and cσ−1i. Since the angle between a¯i and
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c¯σ−1i is twice the angle between a¯i and b¯ρi (and Aˆi lies between a¯i and b¯ρi), we see that
woman bρi appears second on the preference list of Ai.
Since Cˆi lies between c¯i and a¯σi and is closer to c¯i, we see that ci will appear first on
the preference list of Ci. By construction, the angle between c¯i and a¯σi is 4θi. We note
that the angle between Cˆi and c¯i is 2/5(4θi) = 8/5 θi and that between Cˆi and a¯σi is
3/5(4θi) = 12/5 θi. We consider two cases (i) ci is not the first woman in Wj for 1 ≤ j ≤ l,
i.e. σi /∈ Rep(σ), (ii) ci is the first woman in some Wj for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, i.e. σi = ej for some
1 ≤ j ≤ l.
Case(i) As ci is not the first woman in Wj for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, the women positioned
next to ci are aσi and bρi where ci ∈ T (σi) and bρi ∈ T (i). The angle between (the
projection of) b¯ρi and c¯i is the angle between two adjacent T (·)’s, which is one-fourth of
the angle between c¯i and a¯σi, i.e. 1/4(4θi) = θi. Hence, the angle between Cˆi and bρi is
θi + 8/5 θi = 13/5 θi > 12/5 θi. Hence, aσi appears second on the preference list of Ci.
Case(ii) As ci is the first woman in some Wj for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, the women positioned next
to ci are aσi and bx where ci, aσi ∈ Wj and bx ∈ Wj−1. Note that j − 1
def
= l if j = 1.
The angle between c¯i and a¯σi is at most ǫ and the angle between c¯i and b¯x is the angle
between Wj−1 and Wj which is (2π − lǫ)/l = 2π/l − ǫ > ǫ. Hence, aσi appears second on
the preference list of Ci.
Lastly we examine the preference list of Bi. We will show that the relative order of
the b- women on the preference list of Bi is bnbn−1bn−2 · · · b1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and that Bi
prefers b1 over any woman w /∈ {b1, . . . , bn}. This will imply that the preference list of Bi
starts with bnbn−1 · · · b1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The dot product of Bˆi and b¯j is
Bˆi · b¯j = sinφ a¯i · b¯j + cos φ 4
j.
Hence, cosφ 4j − sinφ ≤ Bˆi · b¯j ≤ cosφ 4
j + sinφ, and
cos φ 4j − φ ≤ Bˆi · b¯j ≤ cosφ 4
j + φ.
Comparing Bˆi · b¯j with Bˆi · b¯j+1, we observe that
Bˆi · b¯j ≤ cos φ 4
j + φ < cos φ 4j+1 − φ ≤ Bˆi · b¯j+1 (since φ = 2π/100, cosφ > 3/4).
This implies that the relative order of the b-women on the preference list of Bi is bnbn−1bn−2
· · · b1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Next we show that Bi prefers b1 over any woman w /∈ {b1, · · · , bn}. Every woman
w /∈ {b1, · · · , bn} lies in the x-y plane. Hence, it is enough to consider the projection of Bˆi
in the plane which is sinφ a¯i. Comparing Bˆi · b¯1 with Bˆi · a¯x and Bˆi · c¯x for 1 ≤ x ≤ n, we
observe that
Bˆi · b¯1 ≥ cos φ 4− φ > (3/4) · 4− φ > 2,
Bˆi · a¯x = sin φ a¯i · a¯x ≤ sin φ ≤ φ < 1 < Bˆi · b¯1, and
Bˆi · c¯x = sin φ a¯i · c¯x ≤ sinφ ≤ φ < 1 < Bˆi · b¯1.
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Hence, we have that the preference list of Bi starts with bnbn−1bn−2 · · · b1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Next we show that Bi prefers ai over any woman w /∈ {ai, b1, · · · , bn}. Comparing Bˆi · a¯i
with Bˆi · a¯x, where x 6= i and Bˆi · c¯j for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we find that
Bˆi · a¯i = sin φ a¯i · a¯i = sinφ,
Bˆi · a¯x = sin φ a¯i · a¯x < sinφ = Bˆi · a¯i (since a¯i · a¯x < 1 for i 6= x), and
Bˆi · c¯x = sin φ a¯i · c¯x < sin φ = Bˆi · a¯i.
Now the preference list of Bi reads bnbn−1bn−2 · · · b1ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Finally, we consider
two cases - (i) ai is not the last a-woman in any Wj where 1 ≤ j ≤ l (ii) ai is the last
a-woman in some Wj where 1 ≤ j ≤ l.
Case (i) Suppose ai ∈ Wj for some j ∈ {1, · · · , l}. As ai is not the last a-woman in
Wj , the next a-woman in Wj is aσi. In other words, ai ∈ T (i) and aσi ∈ T (σi) where
T (i) = {cσ−1i, ai, bρi} and T (σi) = {ci, aσi, bρσi}. The angle between c¯σ−1i and a¯i is 4θj, and
that between a¯i and (the projection of) b¯ρi is 2θj. The angle between b¯ρi and c¯i is the angle
between T (i) and T (σi) which is θj . Hence, the angle between a¯i and c¯i is 2θj + θj = 3θj .
Note that the projection of the b-women onto the unit circle is irrelevant as they have
already been ranked by Bi. Hence, we need only consider the a-women and the c-women.
Given the placement of the preference vector Bˆi, after ai, Bi will prefer either cσ−1i or ci.
Comparing the dot product of Bˆi with c¯σ−1i and with c¯i, we get
Bˆi · c¯i = sin φ a¯i · c¯i = sinφ cos 3θj , and
Bˆi · c¯σ−1i = sin φ a¯i · c¯σ−1i = sin φ cos 4θj < sinφ cos 3θj = Bˆi · c¯i.
Hence, the preference list of Bi reads bnbn−1bn−2 · · · b1aici.
Case (ii) Suppose ai ∈ Wj for some j ∈ {1, · · · , l} and ai is the last a-woman in the
group. This implies that ai ∈ T (i) = {cσ−1i, ai, bρi} and T (i) is the last sub-group of Wj .
Since T (i) is the last sub-group of Wj , Wj starts with the sub-group T (σi) = {ci, aσi, bρσi}
followed by T (σ2i), · · · , T (σpj−1i), T (σpj i) = T (i). The angle subtended by the group Wj
at the origin is ǫ and (2π − lǫ)/l is the angle between two adjacent W groups. Hence,
comparing the dot product of Bˆi with any a-woman or c-woman in Wj with any a-woman
or c-woman from Wx where x 6= j, we obtain
w1 ∈ Wj , w2 ∈ Wx, x 6= j, w1, w2 /∈ {b1, · · · , bn}
Bˆi · w¯1 = sinφ a¯i · w¯1 ≥ sin φ cos ǫ, and
Bˆi · w¯2 = sinφ a¯i · w¯2 ≤ sin φ cos((2π − lǫ)/l) < sin φ cos ǫ ≤ Bˆi · w¯1.
We conclude that Bi prefers the a-women and c-women in Wj over any a or c-woman
in any other group. Within Wj , the T (·) sub-groups occur in the order T (i), T (σi), . . . ,
T (σpj−1i) and the projection of Bˆi lies inside T (i). We remind the reader that within
T (σmi), where 1 ≤ m ≤ pj, the angle between c¯σm−1i and a¯σmi is 4θj , the angle between
20
a¯σmi and b¯ρσmi is 2θj , and that between two adjacent T (·)’s is θj , where (7pj − 1)θj = ǫ.
This implies that for 1 ≤ m ≤ pj the angle between a¯σmi and the projection of Bˆi (which
is the angle between a¯σmi and a¯i) is (pj−m)7θj . For 1 ≤ m ≤ pj , the angle between c¯σm−1i
and the projection of Bˆi (which is the angle between c¯σm−1i and a¯i) is (pj −m)7θj + 4θj =
(7(pj −m)+ 4)θj . Now computing the dot product of Bˆi with a¯σmi and c¯σm−1i, we see that
for 1 ≤ m ≤ pj , θj = ǫ/(7pj − 1), we have
Bˆi · a¯σmi = sinφ a¯i · a¯σmi = sinφ cos(7(pj −m)θj),
Bˆi · c¯σm−1i = sinφ a¯i · c¯σm−1i = sinφ cos((7(pj −m) + 4)θj),
Bˆi · c¯σm−1i = sinφ cos((7(pj −m) + 4)θj) < sinφ cos(7(pj −m)θj)
= Bˆi · a¯σmi , 1 ≤ m ≤ pj, and
Bˆi · a¯σmi = sinφ cos(7(pj −m)θj) < sinφ cos((7(pj −m− 1) + 4)θj)
= Bˆi · c¯σmi , 1 ≤ m ≤ pj − 1.
Combining the above inequalities and using the fact that i = σ−1ej = σ
pj−1ej , we get
Bˆi · c¯i < Bˆi · a¯σi < Bˆi · c¯σi < · · · < Bˆi · c¯σ(pj−1)i < Bˆi · a¯σpj i = Bˆi · a¯i.
Hence, the preference list of Bi is bnbn−1bn−2 · · · b1aicσ(pj−1)iaσ(pj−1)i · · ·aσ2icσiaσici.
We remind the reader that ei ∈ Rep(σ) is a representative element of cycle Di and
Wi is partitioned into T (ei), T (σei), . . . , T (σ
(pi−1)ei) where the sub-groups are embedded
on the unit circle in the order T (ei) through T (σ
(pi−1)ei) with T (σ
(pi−1)ei) being the last
sub-group in Wi. We now have the initial part of the preference lists of Ai, Ci and Bi.
They are as follows:
for ei ∈ Rep(σ), (2)
Aσmei : aσmeibρσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1,
Cσ(m−1)ei : cσ(m−1)eiaσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1,
Bσmei : bnbn−1bn−2 · · · b1aσmeicσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 2, and
Bσ(pi−1)ei : bnbn−1bn−2 · · · b1aσ(pi−1)eicσ(pi−2)eiaσ(pi−2)ei · · ·aσeiceiaeicσ(pi−1)ei.
The partial preference lists of the women can be obtained by arguments similar to those
used for obtaining the men’s preference lists. The partial preference lists for the women
are as follows:
for fi ∈ Rep(ρ), (3)
bρmfi : Aρ(m−1)fiBρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1,
cρmfi : BρmfiCρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1,
aρmfi : CnCn−1 · · ·C1BρmfiAρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 2, and
aρ(qi−1)fi : CnCn−1 · · ·C1
Bρ(qi−1)fiAρ(qi−2)fiBρ(qi−2)fi · · ·Bρ2fiAρfiBρfiAfiBfiAρ(qi−1)fi.
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We note that we have not specified the entire preference lists for the men and women.
The remaining portion of each preference list appears after the part that we have given
above, and there will never be any stable pairs involving a man/woman pair that is not
shown on the partial preference lists given. The partial lists we have given are sufficient to
find the male- and female-optimal matchings, and they contain the necessary information
to generate all of the stable matchings for our constructed instance, or equivalently, to find
all of the rotations for this instance.
4.2 Male- and female-optimal matchings
The rest of our analysis will use the partial preference lists in (2) and (3) and will not
otherwise depend upon the position and preference vectors. In order to re-use our analysis
in Section 6, we will be less specific about the men’s partial preference lists (2). Let
τ be a permutation of {1, . . . , n}. Note that the men’s partial preference lists from (2)
correspond to the following partial preference lists by taking the permutation τ to be the
identity permutation.
For ei ∈ Rep(σ), (4)
Aσmei : aσmeibρσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1,
Cσ(m−1)ei : cσ(m−1)eiaσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1,
Bσmei : bτ(n)bτ(n−1) · · · bτ(1)aσmeicσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 2, and
Bσ(pi−1)ei : bτ(n)bτ(n−1) · · · bτ(1)aσ(pi−1)eicσ(pi−2)eiaσ(pi−2)ei · · · aσeiceiaeicσ(pi−1)ei.
The rest of our analysis will use the partial preference lists (3) and (4), We will not make
any assumptions about the permutation τ even though, for the purposes of this section,
we could assume that it is the identity permutation.
We will find the male-optimal and female-optimal stable matchings using the Gale-
Shapley algorithm. Recall that the order in which the men proposes does not matter and
any order always leads to the male-optimal matching (provided a man proposes to the
highest-ranked woman (on his preference list) who hasn’t yet rejected him). Therefore, we
may suppose the men propose in the order {A1, . . . , An, C1, . . . , Cn, Bτ(n), . . . , Bτ(1)}.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, men Ai and Ci are paired up with their first choices, women ai and ci
respectively, as each of these women will receive exactly one proposal during the algorithm.
Man Bτ(n) is paired with his first choice, woman bτ(n). Man Bτ(n−1) proposes to woman
bτ(n) and gets rejected as woman bτ(n) prefers man Bτ(n) over Bτ(n−1). Man Bτ(n−1) then
proposes to woman bτ(n−1) and gets accepted. In this manner, man Bτ(i)’s proposals to
women bτ(n), bτ(n−1), · · · , bτ(i+1) are all rejected as woman bτ(j), i + 1 ≤ j ≤ n, prefers
man Bτ(j) over man Bτ(i). Hence, Bτ(i) is paired up with woman bτ(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Therefore, the male-optimal matching matches men Ai, Ci and Bi with women ai, ci and
bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We find the female-optimal matching by reversing the roles of men and women. In
other words, women make proposals and men accept or reject them. Suppose the women
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propose in the order {b1, . . . , bn, c1, . . . , cn, aσn, . . . , aσ1}. Women bi and ci are paired up
with their first choices, namely, men Aρ−1i and Bi. Woman aσn is paired with her first
choice, namely, man Cn. Woman aσ(n−1) proposes to man Cn and gets rejected as man
Cn prefers woman aσn over aσ(n−1). Woman aσ(n−1) then proposes to man Cn−1 and gets
accepted. In this manner, woman aσi’s proposals to men Cn, Cn−1, · · · , Ci+1 are all rejected
as man Cj , i+1 ≤ j ≤ n, prefers woman aσj over woman aσi. Hence, aσi is paired up with
man Ci for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore, the female-optimal matching matches women bi,ci and
ai with men Aρ−1i, Bi and Cσ−1i, respectively, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
As is always the case, as we move from the male-optimal to the female-optimal matching
(by performing a sequence of rotations), the men go down their preference lists starting
from their male-optimal matching partner (their best possible partner) and ending at their
female-optimal matching partner (their worst possible partner) while the women go up their
preference lists starting from their male-optimal matching partner (their worst) and ending
at their female-optimal matching partner (their best). Hence, a man will never be paired
with a woman who appears either ahead of his male-optimal matching partner or after his
female-optimal matching partner on his preference list. Similarly, in any stable matching
a woman will never be paired with a man who appears either ahead of her female-optimal
matching partner or after her male-optimal matching partner on her preference list. Hence,
the only part of a man’s preference list that we need to consider is the sub-list that starts
at the male-optimal matching partner and ends at the female-optimal matching partner.
Similarly, for the women we need to consider the sub-list starting at the female-optimal
matching partner and ending at the male-optimal matching partner. These sub-lists are
typically referred to as their truncated preference lists, and these are as follows:
For ei ∈ Rep(σ) , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1 , 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
Aσmei : aσmeibρσmei ,
Cσ(m−1)ei : cσ(m−1)eiaσmei ,
Bτ(j) : bτ(j)bτ(j−1) · · · bτ(1)aτ(j)cτ(j) , τ(j) 6= σ
pi−1ei
Bτ(j) : bτ(j)bτ(j−1) · · · bτ(1)aτ(j)cσ−1τ(j)aσ−1τ(j) · · ·
cστ(j)aστ(j)cτ(j) , τ(j) = σ
pi−1ei
For fi ∈ Rep(ρ) ,
bρmfi : Aρ(m−1)fiBρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1
cρmfi : BρmfiCρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1
aρmfi : Cσ−1(ρmfi)Cσ−1(ρmfi)−1 · · ·C1BρmfiAρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 2
aρ(qi−1)fi : Cσ−1(ρ(qi−1)fi)Cσ−1(ρ(qi−1)fi)−1 · · ·C1
Bρ(qi−1)fiAρ(qi−2)fiBρ(qi−2)fi · · ·Bρ2fiAρfiBρfiAfiBfiAρ(qi−1)fi .
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4.3 Extracting rotations
We first observe that the male-optimal matching and female-optimal matching partners are
different for every person. This implies that each man is involved in at least one rotation
and, hence, every man has a well-defined suitor with respect to the male-optimal stable
matching. Also, every man has at least two stable partners. The truncated preference
lists of men Ai and Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are of length two each. Hence, men Ai and Ci are
each involved in exactly one rotation. Their suitors in the male-optimal matching M0 are
SM0(Ai) = bρi and SM0(Ci) = aσi, respectively.
Note: Throughout this section we useM0 to denote the male-optimal stable matching.
Lemma 8 In a stable matching M, if Ai is paired with ai, then SM(Ai) = bρi = SM0(Ai).
Proof: The truncated preference lists of man Ai and woman bρi are aibρi and AiBρi,
respectively. Since bρi is paired with Bρi in the male-optimal stable matching M0, the
spouse of bρi in M is a man M
∗ ∈ {Ai, Bρi}. Since Ai is paired with ai in M, bρi is paired
with Bρi. Hence, bρi prefers Ai over her partner in M. This, in turn, implies that the
suitor of Ai in M, SM(Ai), is bρi. 
Lemma 9 In a stable matching M, if Ci is paired with ci, then SM(Ci) = aσi = SM0(Ci).
Proof: The truncated preference list of man Ci is ciaσi. The truncated preference list
of woman aσi is either
CiCi−1 · · ·C1BσiAσi
or CiCi−1 · · ·C1BσiAρ−1σiBρ−1σi · · ·AρσiBρσiAσi.
We note that the truncated list of aσi starts with Ci. In M0, aσi is paired up with Aσi.
This implies that in the current stable matching M, aσi is paired with a man M
∗ who is
as high as Aσi on her preference list. As Ci is paired up with ci in M, M
∗ 6= Ci. Hence,
in the current stable matching M, aσi prefers Ci over M
∗. This, in turn, implies that
SM(Ci) = aσi. 
Next we prove that SM0(Bi) = ai.
Lemma 10 The suitor of man Bτ(i) in M0 is SM0(Bτ(i)) = aτ(i).
Proof: The truncated preference list of man Bτ(i) depends on the position of his sub-
script in the ρ-cycle. But we note that the initial part of the truncated preference list of
Bτ(i) is bτ(i)bτ(i−1) · · · bτ(1)aτ(i) for all i. Since our arguments only require the initial part of
the truncated preference list, we do not have to consider separate cases. The spouse of Bτ(i)
in M0 is spM0(Bτ(i)) = bτ(i). Suppose the suitor of Bτ(i) is SM0(Bτ(i)) = bτ(j) for some j,
1 ≤ j < i. This would imply that bτ(j) prefers Bτ(i) over Bτ(j). But the initial part of bτ(j)’s
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preference list is Aρ−1τ(j)Bτ(j) · · · . Hence, bτ(j) prefers Bτ(j) over Bτ(i). This contradicts the
assumption that SM0(Bτ(i)) = bτ(j). This would imply that SM0(Bτ(i)) 6= bτ(j) for every
j < i. Since aτ(i) is paired up with Aτ(i) in the male-optimal matchingM0 and aτ(i) prefers
Bτ(i) over Aτ(i), SM0(Bτ(i)) = aτ(i). 
The next two lemmas give the suitor of Bi in stable matchings which satisfy certain
conditions.
Lemma 11 In a stable matching M, if Ck is paired with ck for 1 ≤ k ≤ n and Bτ(i) is
paired with bτ(i), then SM(Bτ(i)) = aτ(i) = SM0(Bτ(i)).
Proof: The initial part of the truncated preference list of man Bτ(i) is bτ(i)bτ(i−1) · · · bτ(1)
aτ(i). The spouse of Bτ(i) in M is spM(Bτ(i)) = bτ(i). Suppose the suitor of Bτ(i) is
SM(Bτ(i)) = bτ(j) for some j, 1 ≤ j < i. This would imply that bτ(j) prefers Bτ(i) over
Bτ(j). As the initial part of bτ(j)’s preference list is Aρ−1τ(j)Bτ(j) · · · and bτ(j) is paired with
Bτ(j) in the male-optimal stable matching, the partner of bτ(j) in the current matching
M would be a man M∗ who is as high as Bτ(j) on her preference list. Since bτ(j) prefers
Bτ(j) over Bτ(i), bτ(j) would prefer M
∗ over Bτ(i). This contradicts the assumption that
SM(Bτ(i)) = bτ(j). This would entail that SM(Bτ(i)) 6= bτ(j) for every j < i.
Next we will show that SM(Bτ(i)) = aτ(i). In the male-optimal stable matching M0,
aτ(i) is paired up with Aτ(i). This implies that in the current stable matching M, aτ(i) is
paired with a man M∗ who is as high as Aτ(i) on her preference list, i.e. spM(aτ(i)) = M
∗.
We note that aτ(i)’s truncated preference list is either
Cσ−1(τ(i))Cσ−1(τ(i))−1 · · ·C1Bτ(i)Aτ(i)
or Cσ−1(τ(i))Cσ−1(τ(i))−1 · · ·C1Bτ(i)Aρ−1(τ(i))Bρ−1(τ(i)) · · ·Aρτ(i)Bρτ(i)Aτ(i).
The initial part of aτ(i)’s truncated list is Cσ−1(τ(i))Cσ−1(τ(i))−1 · · ·C1Bτ(i). As Ck is paired
up with ck for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and Bτ(i) is paired up with bτ(i) in the current matching M,
M∗ /∈ {Cσ−1(τ(i)), Cσ−1(τ(i))−1, · · ·C1, Bτ(i)}. Hence, in the current matchingM, aτ(i) prefers
Bτ(i) over her partner M
∗. This, in turn, implies that SM(Bτ(i)) = aτ(i). 
Lemma 12 In a stable matching M, if, for all k, woman ak is paired with man Mk,
who is at least as high as Bk on her preference list, and if Bτ(i) is paired with aτ(i), then
SM(Bτ(i)) = cτ(i) = spMt(Bτ(i)), where Mt is the female-optimal stable matching.
Proof: We will consider two cases depending on the preference list of Bτ(i).
Case (i) The truncated preference list of man Bτ(i) is
bτ(i)bτ(i−1) · · · bτ(1)aτ(i)cτ(i).
As the truncated preference list of woman cτ(i) is Bτ(i)Cτ(i) and the spouse of cτ(i) in the
male-optimal stable matching is Cτ(i), spM(cτ(i)) ∈ {Bτ(i), Cτ(i)}. As the spouse of Bτ(i) in
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M is aτ(i) (by assumption), spM(cτ(i)) = Cτ(i). Hence, cτ(i) prefers Bτ(i) over her partner
in M. Therefore, the suitor of Bτ(i) in M, SM(Bτ(i)) = cτ(i).
Case (ii) The truncated preference list of man Bτ(i) is
bτ(i)bτ(i−1) · · · bτ(1)aτ(i)cσ−1(τ(i))aσ−1(τ(i)) · · · cστ(i)aστ(i)cτ(i).
As the spouse of Bτ(i). in M is aτ(i) (by assumption), and cτ(i) is the partner of Bτ(i) in
the female-optimal stable matching, SM(Bτ(i)) ∈ {cσ−1(τ(i)), aσ−1(τ(i)), . . . cστ(i), aστ(i), cτ(i)}.
Suppose SM(Bτ(i)) = cσk(τ(i)) 6= cτ(i). As the initial part of the preference list of woman
cσk(τ(i)) is Bσk(τ(i))Cσk(τ(i)), we see that cσk(τ(i)) prefers Cσk(τ(i)) over Bτ(i). As the spouse
of cσk(τ(i)) in the male-optimal stable matching is Cσk(τ(i)), then spM(cσk(τ(i)))
def
= M∗ is at
least as high as Cσk(τ(i)) on her preference list. Hence, cσk(τ(i)) prefers her partner in M
over Bτ(i). Therefore, SM(Bτ(i)) = cσk(τ(i))( 6= cτ(i)) is not possible.
Suppose SM(Bτ(i)) = aσk(τ(i)) 6= aτ(i). The initial part of the truncated preference list
of woman aσk(τ(i)) is Cσk−1(τ(i))Cσk−1(τ(i))−1 · · ·C1Bσk(τ(i)). As the partner of aσk(τ(i)) in the
stable matching M is at least as high as Bσk(τ(i)), we have
M∗ ∈ {Cσk−1(τ(i)), Cσk(τ(i))−1, · · · , C1, Bσk(τ(i))}.
Hence, aσk(τ(i)) prefers M
∗ over Bτ(i). Therefore, SM(Bτ(i)) = aσk(τ(i))( 6= aτ(i)) is not
possible.
Now we will show that SM(Bτ(i)) = cτ(i). As the truncated preference list of woman cτ(i)
is Bτ(i)Cτ(i) and the spouse of cτ(i) in the male-optimal stable matching is Cτ(i), spM(cτ(i)) ∈
{Bτ(i), Cτ(i)}. As the spouse of Bτ(i) in M is aτ(i), spM(cτ(i)) = Cτ(i). Hence, cτ(i) prefers
Bτ(i) over her partner in M. Therefore, the suitor of Bτ(i) in M, SM(Bτ(i)) = cτ(i). 
We will later observe that a stable matching obtained after performing a set of ρ-
rotations satisfies conditions laid out in Lemmas 8 and 11. Hence, the above lemmas help
in establishing the suitors of A-men and B-men in the stable matchings obtained after
performing ρ-rotations.
We note that the Find-All-Rotations algorithm obtains all the rotations of the in-
stance irrespective of whatever ordering of the men we use in that procedure (to initialize
the first proposal to his suitor). We order the men as follows: {A1, · · · , An, C1, · · · , Cn, B1,
· · · , Bn}. In the male-optimal matching M0, A1 is paired with a1. Find-All-Rotations
starts with man A1 whose suitor is bρ1. The sequence in that algorithm starts with the
pair (A1, a1). As bρ1 is the suitor of A1, the next pair in the sequence is (spM0(bρ1), bρ1) =
(Bρ1, bρ1). With aρ1 being the suitor of Bρ1, the next pair is (spM0(aρ1), aρ1) = (Aρ1, aρ1).
The pair (Aρ1, aρ1) results in (Bρ21, bρ21). In this manner, we grow the sequence (A1, a1),
(Bρ1, bρ1), (Aρ1, aρ1), (Bρ2, bρ2), · · · . As the suitor of Ai is bρi and that of Bi is ai, we
observe that the sequence alternates between A-men and B-men. We also note that the
pair (A1, a1) results in the pair (Aρ1, aρ1) and the pair (Bρ1, bρ1) results in (Bρ21, aρ21). In
other words, the subscripts of the A-men and the B-men involved in the above sequence
are from a ρ-cycle, in particular, the ρ-cycle containing 1. Suppose the ρ-cycle containing
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1 is of size p1, that is, the ρ-cycle containing 1 is (1, 2, . . . , p1). Then the sequence we end
up with is
{(A1, a1), (Bρ1, bρ1), (Aρ1, aρ1), · · · , (Bρp1−11, bρp1−11), (Aρp1−11, aρp1−11), (Bρp11, bρp11)}
= {(A1, a1), (B2, b2), (A2, a2), · · · , (Bp1, bp1), (Ap1, ap1), (B1, b1)},
using that (Bρp11, bρp11) = (B1, b1). Lemma 11 tells us this ends the sequence in the Find-
All-Rotations algorithm, and we have therefore found a rotation.
(Note: If we start with any Ai or Bi, with i ∈ (1, 2, . . . , p1), we will discover the same
rotation, as the resulting sequence we find is a cyclic shift of the one given above.)
After applying the above ρ-rotation, Ai is paired with bρi (for 1 ≤ i ≤ p1), his partner
in the female-optimal matching. Hence, in this new stable matching the men A1, . . . , Ap1
do not have suitors and will therefore not participate in future rotations. We also note
that the only men who changed their partners in the above rotation were A-men and B-
men with subscripts in the ρ-cycle containing 1. Hence, Ck is still paired up with ck for
1 ≤ k ≤ n, and Ai and Bi are paired up with ai and bi, respectively, when the subscript i
does not belong to the ρ-cycle containing 1.
Let M1 denote this new matching after applying this first ρ-cycle we have discovered.
We note that M1 satisfies the conditions laid out in Lemmas 8 and 11 which, in turn,
tells us that SM1(Ai) = bρi and SM1(Bi) = ai for i /∈ {1, 2, · · · , p1}. Find-All-Rotations
then picks the next man who has a well-defined suitor, namely Ap1+1, whose suitor is
SM1(Ap1+1) = bρ(p1+1), and constructs the next rotation. From the above exercise of
constructing a rotation corresponding to a ρ-cycle, it is clear that the rotation containing
man Ap1+1 will be a ρ-rotation involving A-men and B-men whose subscripts belong to the
ρ-cycle that contains p1+1. Proceeding in this manner, we obtain all rotations (ρ-rotations)
involving men Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Every Bi will participate in exactly one ρ-rotation as every i ∈ [n], belongs to exactly
one cycle of the permutation ρ. After applying all the ρ-rotations, we will obtain a stable
matching, sayM′, in which the spouses of men Ai, Bi and Ci are bρi, ai, and ci, respectively.
As was observed before, all the A-men are paired up with their partners from the female-
optimal stable matching. Thus, none of the A-men will participate in any of the future
rotations. As was also noted, the C-men each participate in exactly one rotation and the
suitor of Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is aσi as long as Ci is paired with ci in the stable matching. From
Lemma 12, it follows that the suitor of Bi in M
′ is ci. All of the B-men and C-men have
well-defined suitors.
The next man picked by Find-All-Rotations is C1 whose suitor is aσi. The se-
quence starts with the pair (Ci, ci). As aσi is the suitor of Ci, the next pair in the
sequence is (spM′(aσi), aσi) = (Bσi, aσi). Similarly, as the suitor of Bσi is cσi, the next
pair in the sequence is (spM′(cσi), cσi) = (Cσi, cσi). Continuing from (Cσi, cσi), we get
the pair (Bσ2i, aσ2i). Proceeding in this manner, we generate the rotation. We note
that the suitor of Bi is ci and that of Ci is aσi thereby forcing us to alternate be-
tween C-men and B-men. We also note that the pair (Ci, ci) eventually results in the
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pair (Cσi, cσi and (Bσi, aσi) resulted in the pair (Bσ2i, aσ2i). In other words, the sub-
scripts of the C-men and the B-men in the rotation are governed by a σ-cycle, in par-
ticular, the σ cycle containing 1. Suppose the σ-cycle containing 1 is of size q1, that
is, the σ-cycle containing 1 is (1, σ1, . . . , σq1−11). Then the rotation we end up with is
{(C1, c1), (Bσ1, aσ1), (Cσ1, cσ1), · · · , (Bσq1−11, aσq1−11), (Cσq1−11, cσq1−11), (Bσq11, aσq11)},
where (Bσq11, aσq11) = (B1, a1).
After performing the above σ-rotation, for 0 ≤ k ≤ q1 − 1, Cσk1, is paired with aσk+11,
his partner in the female-optimal matching. Hence, men C1, · · · , Cσq1−11 no longer have
suitors and will not participate in any future rotations. We note that the only men who
changed their partners in the above rotation were C-men and B-men with subscripts in
the σ-cycle containing 1. Hence, Ak is still paired with bρk for k ∈ [n], and Ci and Bi are
paired up with ci and ai, respectively, when the subscript i does not belong to the σ-cycle
containing 1.
Let M′1 denote the new matching after applying this σ-rotation. We note that M
′
1
satisfies the conditions laid out in Lemmas 9 and 12 which, in turn, entails that SM′1(Ci) =
aσi and SM′1(Bi) = ci for i /∈ {1, σ1, · · · , σ
q1−11}. Find-All-Rotations picks the next
man who has a well-defined suitor, say Ci1 , where
i1 = min{i : Ci is paired with ci in M
′
1 and 1 ≤ i ≤ n},
and constructs a new rotation. The suitor of Ci1 is SM′1(Ci1) = aσi1 . From the above
exercise of constructing a rotation corresponding to a σ-cycle, it is clear that the rotation
containing man Ci1 will be a σ-rotation involving C-men and B-men whose subscripts
belong to the σ-cycle containing i1. Proceeding in this manner, we obtain all σ-rotations
involving men Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Each Bi will participate in exactly one σ-rotation, as every
i ∈ [n] belongs to exactly one cycle of the permutation σ.
After applying all the σ-rotations, we have a stable matching, say M′′, in which the
spouses of men Ai, Bi and Ci are bρi, ci, and aσi, respectively. All the men are paired up
with their partners from the female-optimal stable matching. Hence,M′′ =Mt whereMt
is the female-optimal stable matching. Therefore we do not have any further rotations to
extract. Hence, the only rotations in the rotation poset of the stable matching instance
are the rotations governed by the ρ- and σ-cycles, namely ρ-rotations and σ-rotations.
Therefore, the only stable pairs of the instance are (Ai, ai), (Ai, bρi), (Bi, bi), (Bi, ai),
(Bi, ci), (Ci, ci), and (Ci, aσi) for i ∈ [n].
We still have to prove that the ρ-rotations correspond to vertices in V1 and the σ-
rotations correspond to vertices in V2. We prove this fact in the next section.
4.4 Ordering rotations
In this section, we compare rotations using the explicitly precedes relation as in Defini-
tion 3.6.
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Recalling Definition 3.5, it follows that a man-woman pair (M,w) can be eliminated if
and only if there exist stable pairs (M1, w) and (M2, w) such that w prefers M1 over M
and M appears as high as M2 on w’s preference list. In other words, a man-woman pair
(M,w) can be eliminated if and only if M appears on the truncated preference list of w
and is not the partner of w in the female-optimal stable matching. This identifies all the
man-woman pairs eliminated by rotations of the instance.
Recall from the previous section that the only stable pairs of the matching instance are
(Ai, ai), (Ai, bρi), (Bi, bi), (Bi, ai), (Bi, ci), (Ci, ci), (Ci, aσi) for i ∈ [n]. Of these stable pairs,
(Ai, bρi), (Bi, ci), and (Ci, aσi) are pairs in the female-optimal stable matching. Hence, the
only stable pairs that are eliminated by rotations are (Ai, ai), (Bi, bi), (Bi, ai) and (Ci, ci)
for i ∈ [n]. We list all the eliminated pairs below and highlight those that are stable.
For fi ∈ Rep(ρ) ,
bρmfi : Bρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1
cρmfi : Cρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1
aρmfi : Cσ−1(ρmfi−1) · · ·C1BρmfiAρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 2
aρ(qi−1)fi : Cσ−1(ρ(qi−1)fi−1) · · ·Cσ−11Bρ(qi−1)fiAρ(qi−2)fiBρ(qi−2)fi · · ·Bρ2fiAρfiBρfiAρ(qi−1)fi
In Definition 3.6, rotation R eliminates pair (M,w) and rotation R′ moves man M to
woman w′ such thatM prefers w over w′. Hence, woman w and manM belong to rotations
R and R′, respectively.
Lemma 13 Suppose R′ is a ρ-rotation. Then there does not exist a rotation R which
explicitly precedes R′. Therefore, every ρ-rotation is a minimal element of the rotation
poset.
Proof: Suppose there exists a rotation R which explicitly precedes
R′ = {(Bj , bj), (Aj, aj), (Bj+1, bj+1), (Aj+1, aj+1), · · · , (Bj+q−1, bj+q−1), (Aj+q−1, aj+q−1)}.
We consider two cases - (I) R is a ρ-rotation, (II) R is a σ-rotation.
Case (I) Suppose R is a ρ-rotation where
R = {(Bi, bi), (Ai, ai), (Bi+1, bi+1), (Ai+1, ai+1), . . . , (Bi+p−1, bi+p−1), (Ai+p−1, ai+p−1)}.
The ρ-cycles corresponding to rotations R and R′ are (i, i + 1, . . . , i + p − 1) and (j, j +
1, . . . , j + q − 1). Since any two ρ-cycles are disjoint, the corresponding ρ-rotations are
disjoint, i.e. ρ-rotations R and R′ do not share either a man or a woman. Since R explicitly
precedes R′, there exists a man-woman pair (M,w) with M belonging to rotation R′ and
w belonging to rotation R such that R eliminates the pair (M,w) and R′ moves M to a
woman w′ below w on his list. In other words, there exist
a man M ∈ {Bj , Bj+1, . . . , Bj+q−1, Aj , Aj+1, . . . , Aj+q−1}, and
a woman w ∈ {bi, bi+1, · · · , bi+p−1, ai, ai+1, · · · , ai+p−1}
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satisfying the above property. We consider a set of sub-cases, depending upon possible
values of M and w.
Subcase (I-a) (M,w) ∈ {(Bx, by), (Ax, by)}. We note that x 6= y, and x and y are from
different ρ-cycles. From the table of eliminated pairs, we note that the set of eliminated
pairs involving woman by is {(By, by)}. Hence, (M,w) 6= (Bx, by) and (M,w) 6= (Ax, by).
Subcase (I-b) (M,w) = (Ax, ay). We again note that x 6= y, and x and y are from
different ρ-cycles. We also note that woman ay could have one of two possible preference
lists which is reflected in the table of eliminated pairs. After performing rotation R, woman
ay is paired up with By. Hence, the set of pairs eliminated by rotation R involving woman
ay could be either
S = {(Ay, ay)} or
T = {(Aρ−1y, ay), (Bρ−1y, ay), . . . , (Aρy, ay), (Bρy, ay), (Ay, ay)}.
Since we are only interested in eliminated pairs that involve an A-man, we consider sub-
sets of S and T containing A-men which are {(Ay, ay)} and {(Aρ−1y, ay), (Aρ−2y, ay), · · · ,
(Aρy, ay), (Ay, ay)}, respectively. We note that every element of {ρ
−1y, ρ−2y, · · · , ρy, y}
belongs to the ρ-cycle containing y. Since x 6= y and x and y are from different ρ-cycles,
(Ax, ay) /∈ {(Ay, ay)} and (Ax, ay) /∈ {(Aρ−1y, ay), (Aρ−2y, ay), . . . , (Aρy, ay), (Ay, ay)}. Hence,
(M,w) 6= (Ax, ay).
Subcase (I-c) (M,w) = (Bx, ay). As before, x 6= y and x, and y are from different
ρ-cycles. From the table of eliminated pairs, we note that the set of eliminated pairs
involving woman ay could be either
S = {(Ay, ay)} or
T = {(Aρ−1y, ay), (Bρ−1y, ay), . . . , (Aρy, ay), (Bρy, ay), (Ay, ay)}.
Since we are only interested in eliminated pairs that involve a B-man, we consider subsets of
S and T containing B-men which are ∅ and {(By, ay), (Bρ−1y, ay), (Bρ−2y, ay), . . . , (Bρy, ay)},
respectively. We note that every element of {y, ρ−1y, ρ−2y, · · · , ρy} belongs to the ρ-cycle
containing y. Since x 6= y and x and y are from different ρ-cycles,
(Bx, ay) /∈ {(By, ay), (Bρ−1y, ay), (Bρ−2y, ay), · · · , (Bρy, ay)}
and (Bx, ay) /∈ ∅ (vacuously). Hence, (M,w) 6= (Bx, ay).
Therefore, if R explicitly precedes R′, then R is not a ρ-rotation.
Case (II) Suppose R is a σ-rotation where
R = {(Bi, ai), (Ci, ci), (Bσi, aσi), (Cσi, cσi), . . . , (Bσp−1i, aσp−1i), (Cσp−1i, cσp−1i)}.
The σ- and ρ-cycles corresponding to rotations R and R′ are σ1 = (i, σi, . . . , σ
p−1i) and
ρ1 = (j, j + 1, . . . , j + q − 1), respectively. Since R explicitly precedes R
′, there exists a
man-woman pair (M,w) with M belonging to rotation R′ and w belonging to rotation R
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such that R eliminates the pair (M,w) and R′ moves M to a woman w′ below w on his
list. In other words, there exist a man M ∈ {Bj , Bj+1, . . . , Bj+q−1, Aj , Aj+1, . . . , Aj+q−1}
and a woman w ∈ {ai, aσi, . . . , aσp−1i, ci, cσi, . . . , cσp−1i} satisfying the above property. Once
again, there are a set of sub-cases to consider.
Subcase (II-a) (M,w) ∈ {(Bx, cy), (Ax, cy)}. From the table of eliminated pairs, we note
that the set of eliminated pairs involving woman cy is {(Cy, cy)}. Hence, (M,w) 6= (Bx, cy)
and (M,w) 6= (Ax, cy).
Subcase (II-b) (M,w) ∈ {(Bx, ay), (Ax, ay)}. We note that after performing rotation
R′, woman ay is paired up with By. Hence, the pair (By, ay) cannot be an eliminated pair.
This implies that when the eliminated pair (M,w) is of the form (Bx, ay), the subscript x
cannot assume the value y. We observe that even though woman ay could have one of two
possible preference lists, the initial part of her preference list stays the same. We note that
before performing the rotation R woman ay is paired up with man By. After performing
the rotation R, woman ay is paired up with Cσ−1y. Hence, the pairs eliminated by rotation
R that involve woman ay are {(Cσ−1(y)−1, ay), (Cσ−1(y)−2, ay), . . . , (C1, ay), (By, ay)}. Since
{(Bx, ay), (Ax, ay)} ∩ {(Cσ−1(y)−1, ay), (Cσ−1(y)−2, ay), . . . , (C1, ay), (By, ay)} = ∅,
we see (M,w) 6= (Bx, ay) and (M,w) 6= (Ax, ay).
Therefore, if R explicitly precedes R′, then R cannot be a σ-rotation.
From cases (I) and (II), we conclude that a ρ-rotation cannot be explicitly preceded
either by another ρ-rotation or a σ-rotation. Therefore, every ρ-rotation is a minimal
element in the rotation poset. 
Lemma 14 Suppose R is a σ-rotation. Then there does not exist a rotation R′ such that
R explicitly precedes R′. Therefore, every σ-rotation is a maximal element of the rotation
poset.
Proof:
Suppose there exists a rotation R which explicitly precedes R′. We consider two cases.
Case (I) R′ is a ρ-rotation. This case has been dealt with in case (II) of Lemma 13.
Case(II) R′ is a σ-rotation. Let
R = {(Bi, ai), (Ci, ci), (Bσi, aσi), (Cσi, cσi), . . . , (Bσp−1i, aσp−1i)(Cσp−1i, cσp−1i)},
and
R′ = {(Bj , aj), (Cj, cj), (Bσj , aσj), (Cσj , cσj), . . . , (Bσq−1j, aσq−1j), (Cσq−1j , cσq−1j)}.
The σ-cycles corresponding to rotationsR andR′ are (i, σi, . . . , σp−1i) and (j, σj, . . . , σq−1j).
Since any two σ-cycles are disjoint, the corresponding σ-rotations are disjoint, i.e. σ-
rotations R and R′ do not share either a man or a woman. As has been observed before,
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the implication of R explicitly preceding R′ is that there exists a man-woman pair (M,w)
with M belonging to rotation R′ and w belonging to rotation R such that R eliminates
the pair (M,w) and R′ moves M to a woman w′ below w on his list. In other words, there
exist
a man M ∈ {Bj , Bσj , . . . , Bσq−1j, Cj, Cσj , . . . , Cσq−1j} and
a woman w ∈ {ai, aσi, . . . , aσp−1i, ci, cσi, . . . , cσp−1i}
satisfying the above property. As the pair (M,w) has a set of possibilities, we consider a
set of sub-cases.
Subcase (II-a) (M,w) ∈ {(Bx, cy), (Cx, cy)}. We note that x 6= y, and x and y are from
different σ-cycles. From the table of eliminated pairs, we note that the set of eliminated
pairs involving woman cy is {(Cy, cy)}. Hence, (M,w) 6= (Bx, cy) and (M,w) 6= (Cx, cy).
Subcase (II-b) (M,w) = (Bx, ay). As before, we note that x 6= y and x and y are from
different σ-cycles. We also note that the spouses of woman ay before and after performing
the rotation R are By and Cσ−1y, respectively. Hence, the pairs eliminated by rotation R
are
{(Cσ−1(y)−1, ay), (Cσ−1(y)−2, ay), . . . , (C1, ay), (By, ay)}.
As x 6= y, (Bx, ay) /∈ {(Cσ−1(y−1), ay), (Cσ−1(y−2), ay), . . . , (Cσ−11, ay), (By, ay)}. Therefore,
(M,w) 6= (Bx, ay).
Subcase (II-c) (M,w) = (Cx, ay). We note that x and y are from different σ-cycles. We
also note that the spouses of woman ay before and after performing the rotation R are By
and Cσ−1y, respectively. Hence, the pairs eliminated by rotation R are
{(Cσ−1(y)−1, ay), (Cσ−1(y)−2, ay), . . . , (C1, ay), (By, ay)}.
Suppose (Cx, ay) ∈ {(Cσ−1(y)−1, ay), (Cσ−1(y)−2, ay), . . . , (C1, ay), (By, ay)}. This implies
x ∈ {σ−1(y)−1, σ−1(y)−2, . . . , 1}. Recalling that the only stable pairs are (Ai, ai), (Ai, bρi),
(Bi, bi), (Bi, ai), (Bi, ci), (Ci, ci), (Ci, aσi) for i ∈ [n], we see that (Cx, ay) is an unstable pair
as x 6= σ−1y. Therefore, every pair of the form (Cx, ay) that rotation R eliminates is an
unstable pair. Since R explicitly precedes R′ and the pairs of the form (Cx, ay) eliminated
by R are unstable, rotation R′ has to move some Cx below ay on his list. The initial part
of the preference list of Cx is cxaσx for all x ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. In other words, Cx has aσx
above ay for all y 6= σx. After performing rotation R
′, Cx moves from cx to aσx for every
x ∈ {j, σj, · · · , σq−1j}. Therefore, rotation R′ does not take Cx below ay on his preference
list for x ∈ {j, σj, · · · , σq−1j}. Therefore, (M,w) 6= (Cx, ay).
Putting together cases (I) and (II), we conclude that if R is a σ-rotation, then it cannot
explicitly precede any rotation R′. This, in turn, implies that every σ-rotation is a maximal
element in the rotation poset. 
From Lemmas 13 and 14, it follows that the rotation poset of our constructed matching
instance is of height at most 1.
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Lemma 15 Suppose R is a ρ-rotation and R′ is a σ-rotation. Then R explicitly precedes
R′ if and only if R and R′ have a common man. In other words, the ρ and σ-cycles
corresponding to R and R′, respectively, have an element in common.
Proof: Let
R = {(Bi, bi), (Ai, ai), (Bi+1, bi+1), (Ai+1, ai+1), . . . , (Bi+p−1, bi+p−1), (Ai+p−1, ai+p−1)}
and
R′ = {(Bj , aj), (Cj, cj), (Bσj , aσj), (Cσj , cσj), . . . , (Bσq−1j, aσq−1j), (Cσq−1j , cσq−1j)}.
Suppose R and R′ do not have a common man, i.e.
{Bi, Bi+1, . . . , Bi+p−1} ∩ {Bj, Bσj , . . . , Bσq−1j} = ∅.
This, in turn, entails that ρ1 ∩ σ1 = ∅ where ρ1 = {i, i + 1, . . . , i + p − 1} and σ1 =
{j, σj, . . . , σq−1j}. As has been observed before, the implication of R explicitly preceding
R′ is that there exists a man-woman pair (M,w) with M belonging to rotation R′ and
w belonging to rotation R such that R eliminates the pair (M,w) and R′ moves M to a
woman w′ below w on his list. In other words, there exist
a man M ∈ {Bj, Bσj , . . . , Bσq−1j , Cj, Cσj , . . . , Cσq−1j} and
a woman w ∈ {bi, bi+1, . . . , bi+p−1, ai, ai+1, . . . , ai+p−1}
satisfying the above property. We consider a set of sub-cases.
Case (I) (M,w) ∈ {(Bx, by), (Cx, by)}. We note that x 6= y as ρ1 ∩ σ1 = ∅ and x ∈ σ1
and y ∈ ρ1. From the table of eliminated pairs, we note that the set of eliminated pairs
involving woman by is {(By, by)}. Hence, (M,w) 6∈ {(Bx, by), (Cx, by)}.
Case (II) (M,w) ∈ {(Bx, ay), (Cx, ay)}. We note that ay could have one of two possible
preference lists which is reflected in the table of eliminated pairs.
The spouses of ay before and after performing the rotation R are Ay and By, respec-
tively. Hence, the set of pairs eliminated by rotation R involving woman ay could be either
S = {(Ay, ay)} or T = {(Aρ−1y, ay), (Bρ−1y, ay), . . . , (Aρy, ay), (Bρy, ay), (Ay, ay)}. Since
none of the eliminated pairs involve a C-man, (M,w) 6= (Cx, ay).
With (Cx, ay) eliminated from being a possible candidate, we are only interested in
eliminated pairs that involve a B-man. We consider subsets of S and T containing B-men
which are ∅ and {(Bρ−1y, ay), (Bρ−2y, ay), . . . , (Bρy, ay)}, respectively. We note that every
element of ρ1 = {ρ
−1y, ρ−2y, · · · , ρy, y} = {i, i + 1, · · · , i + p − 1} belongs to the ρ-cycle
containing y. As σ1 and ρ1 do not have an element in common, x 6= y and x does not belong
to the ρ-cycle containing y. Therefore, (Bx, ay) /∈ {(Bρ−1y, ay), (Bρ−2y, ay), . . . , (Bρy, ay)}.
Hence, (M,w) 6= (Bx, ay).
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From cases (I) and (II), it follows that if R and R′ do not share a common man, then
there does not exist a man-woman pair (M,w) such that R eliminates (M,w) and R′ moves
M to w′ below w. Hence, R does not explicitly precede R′.
Suppose rotations R and R′ have a common man. In other words,
{Bi, Bi+1, . . . , Bi+p−1} ∩ {Bj, Bσj , . . . , Bσq−1j} 6= ∅.
This, in turn, entails that ρ1 ∩ σ1 6= ∅ where ρ1 = {i, i + 1, . . . , i + p − 1} and σ1 =
{j, σj, . . . , σq−1j}. We also note that a ρ-cycle and a σ-cycle can have at most one element
in common. Therefore, {Bi, Bi+1, . . . , Bi+p−1} ∩ {Bj, Bσj , · · · , Bσq−1j} = {Bl}, say.
As has been observed before, in order to establish that R explicitly precedes R′, it
is enough to produce a man-woman pair (M,w) with M belonging to rotation R′ and w
belonging to rotation R such thatR eliminates the pair (M,w) and R′ movesM to a woman
w′ below w on his list. In other words, it is enough to show that there exist a man M ∈
{Bj, Bσj , . . . , Bσq−1j, Cj, Cσj , . . . , Cσq−1j} and a woman w ∈ {bi, bi+1, . . . , bi+p−1, ai, ai+1 . . . ,
ai+p−1} satisfying the above property. We show that the pair (Bl, bl) is the required pair.
Since Bl participates in the rotation R, the spouses of Bl before and after the rotation
R are bl and al, respectively. Hence, the pair (Bl, bl) is eliminated by R, and R moves Bl to
al, which is below bl. Since Bl belongs to R
′, the spouses of Bl before and after performing
the rotation R′ are al and cl, respectively. Hence, R
′ moves Bl to cl which is below al. This
entails that rotation R′ moves Bl to cl which is below bl on his preference list. Therefore,
R eliminates the pair (Bl, bl) and R
′ moves Bl to the woman cl who is below al on Bl’s
preference list. This implies that R explicitly precedes R′.
Hence, it follows that if R and R′ share a man, then R explicitly precedes R′. This
proves the lemma. 
From Lemma 15, it follows that the rotation poset has an edge from a ρ-rotation to a
σ-rotation (i.e. ρ ≤ σ in the ordering of the rotations) if and only if the rotations share a
common man. Hence, the rotation poset has height 1. In other words, the rotation poset
has an edge between two vertices if and only if the cycles corresponding to the vertices
have an element in common. The edges of the bipartite graph, which was introduced early
on, were defined in a similar fashion. Hence, the rotation poset when considered as a graph
is isomorphic to a bipartite graph.
5 The 1-attribute case
In this section we concentrate our attention to the 1-attribute model. This case is very
special and we establish the following result.
Theorem 2 #SM(1−attribute) is solvable in polynomial time.
Theorem 2 is obtained as a corollary of the following theorem.
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Theorem 16 In the 1-attribute model, the rotation poset of a stable matching instance is
(isomorphic to) a path.
Theorem 2 follows as it is straightforward to count the downsets of a path. We establish
Theorem 16 through a series of lemmas.
First, we observe that in the 1-attribute model the men have only two possible prefer-
ence lists for the women. The two preference lists are such that one is reverse of the other.
Similarly, the women have only two possible preference lists, one being the reverse of the
other.
We start by establishing that every rotation in the 1-attribute model is of even size. In
other words, every rotation involves an even number of men.
Lemma 17 In the 1-attribute model, every rotation is of even size, and the preference lists
of the men (and, similarly, the women) involved in the rotation alternate.
Proof: We establish the statement by showing that two consecutive men in a rotation
cannot both have the same preference list. Then, since there are only two possible pref-
erence lists and the preference lists of any two consecutive men have to be different, we
conclude that the number of men involved in the rotation has to be even.
Suppose we have a rotation R of size k. Without loss of generality (by relabeling),
we assume this rotation is (B0, b0), (B1, b1), . . . , (Bk−1, bk−1). Each man Bi is married to
woman bi (in M1) before the rotation, and to woman bi+1 (mod k) (in M2) after the rotation
as shown in the table below.
Men (before R) (after R)
M1 M2
B0 b0 b1
B1 b1 b2
...
Bi bi bi+1
Bi+1 bi+1 bi+2
...
Bk−2 bk−2 bk−1
Bk−1 bk−1 b0
Before we proceed, we note that all subscripts that follow are computed mod k.
To establish our result it is enough to show that two consecutive men in a rotation
cannot both have the same preference lists.
So, suppose to the contrary that men Bi and Bi+1 have the same preference list. Re-
calling that the rotation is female-improving, the preference list of Bi and Bi+1 are shown
below.
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Bi | · · · bi · · · bi+1
Bi+1 | · · · bi+1 · · · bi+2
Since Bi and Bi+1 have the same preference lists, bi comes ahead of bi+1 on Bi+1’s
preference list as shown below.
Bi | · · · bi · · · bi+1
Bi+1 | · · · bi · · · bi+1 · · · bi+2
As M1 is a stable matching, the pair (Bi+1, bi) must not form a blocking pair to the
stable pairs (Bi, bi) and (Bi+1, bi+1) in M1. Since bi comes ahead of bi+1 on Bi+1’s list, Bi+1
must appear after Bi on bi’s preference list to ensure that (Bi+1, bi) does not form such a
blocking pair. Therefore, the preference lists for man Bi+1 and woman bi are as follows.
Bi+1 | · · · bi · · · bi+1 · · · bi+2 | bi | · · · Bi−1 · · · Bi · · · Bi+1
Comparing the preference lists of women bi and bi+1,
bi | · · · Bi−1 · · · Bi · · · Bi+1
bi+1 | · · · Bi · · · Bi+1 · · ·
we note that they are the same. Hence, woman bi+1 also has Bi−1 ahead of Bi on her list.
bi | · · · Bi−1 · · · Bi · · · Bi+1
bi+1 | · · · Bi−1 · · · Bi · · · Bi+1 · · ·
Because M2 is also a stable matching and Bi−1 is ahead of Bi on bi+1’s preference list,
bi+1 must appear after bi on Bi−1’s preference list to prevent (Bi−1, bi+1) from being a
blocking pair in M2. Comparing the preference lists of Bi−1, Bi, and Bi+1, we note that
Bi−1 | · · · bi−1 · · · bi · · · bi+1
Bi | · · · bi · · · bi+1
Bi+1 | · · · bi · · · bi+1 · · · bi+2
they are all the same.
We have shown that man Bi−1 has the same preference list as men Bi and Bi+1, and that
women bi and bi+1 both have the same preference list. We can now repeat the argument
with men Bi−1 and Bi to conclude that men Bi−2 and Bi−1 have the same preference list
and women bi−1 and bi have the same preference list and so on. In this fashion, we can
show that all men involved in the rotation have the same preference list and so do all the
women involved.
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We know that the men involved in a rotation get less happy with their partners as a
result of applying the rotation. Since the men all have the same preference lists, the relative
order of women b1 through bk should be the same. Suppose the order is bi1 , bi2 , · · · , bik .
After the rotation, the man married to bi1 would go down his list and the man married to
bik would go up his list which cannot both happen at the same time. Hence, we cannot
have a rotation if some two consecutive men on the rotation have the same preference lists.
Therefore, the preference lists of the men involved in the rotation have to alternate,
forcing the rotation to be of even size. 
Lemma 18 In the 1-attribute model, every rotation is of size 2.
Proof: Suppose we have a rotation of size 2k involving men B0, B1, ..., B2k−1 and women
b0, b1, ..., b2k−1 where k > 1. Every man Bi is married to woman bi before the rotation and
to woman bi+1 (mod k) after the rotation as shown in the table below.
Men Before After
B0 b0 b1
B1 b1 b2
...
Bi bi bi+1
Bi+1 bi+1 bi+2
...
B2k−2 b2k−2 b2k−1
B2k−1 b2k−1 b0
Since men Bi with i even have the same preference lists, the relative order of women
on their lists is the same. Suppose the order is bi1 , bi2 , · · · , bi2k . Since, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
b2i is ahead of b2i+1, it is clear that i1 is even.
Consider men Bi1−2, Bi1−1, and Bi1 . Note that we are implicitly using the assumption
that k > 1 (otherwise there are not three distinct men). Their preference lists appear as
follows.
Bi1−2 | · · · bi1 · · · bi1−2 · · · bi1−1
Bi1−1 | · · · bi1−1 · · · bi1
Bi1 | · · · bi1 · · · bi1+1
As all pairs (Bj , bj) are part of a stable matching, the pair (Bi1−2, bi1) should not form
a blocking pair to the stable pairs (Bi1−2, bi1−2) and (Bi1 , bi1). Since bi1 comes ahead of
bi1−2 on Bi1−2’s list, Bi1−2 should appear after Bi1 on bi1 ’s preference list to ensure that
(Bi1−2, bi1) does not form a blocking pair. The preference lists for women bi1 and woman
bi1+1 are as follows.
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bi1 | · · · Bi1−1 · · · Bi1 · · · Bi1−2 · · ·
bi1+1 | · · · Bi1−2 · · · Bi1 · · · Bi1+1 · · ·
Note that Bi1−2 appears ahead of Bi1 on bi1+1’s list as the lists of bi1 and bi1+1 are
reverses of each other.
Again, all pairs (Bj, bj+1) are part of a stable matching and (Bi1−2, bi1+1) could form
a blocking pair to the stable pairs (Bi1−2, bi1−1) and (Bi1, bi1+1). Since Bi1−2 is ahead of
Bi1 on bi1+1’s preference list, bi1+1 has to appear after bi1−1 on Bi1−2’s preference list to
prevent (Bi1−2, bi1+1) from becoming a blocking pair. The preference lists of Bi1−2, Bi1−1
and Bi1 are as follows.
Bi1−2 | · · · bi1 · · · bi1−2 · · · bi1−1 · · · bi1+1
Bi1−1 | · · · bi1+1 · · · bi1−1 · · · bi1 · · ·
Bi1 | · · · bi1 · · · bi1+1 · · ·
Note that bi1+1 appears ahead of bi1−1 on Bi1−1’s list as the lists of Bi1−2 and Bi1−1 are
reverses of each other.
The pair (Bi1−1, bi1+1) should not form a blocking pair to the stable pairs (Bi1−1, bi1−1)
and (Bi1+1, bi1+1). Since bi1+1 comes ahead of bi1−1 on Bi1−1’s list, Bi1−1 should appear
after Bi1+1 on bi1+1’s preference list to ensure that (Bi1−1, bi1+1) does not form a blocking
pair. The preference lists for women bi1 and woman bi1+1 are as follows.
bi1 | · · · Bi1−1 · · · Bi1 · · · Bi1−2 · · ·
bi1+1 | · · · Bi1−2 · · · Bi1 · · · Bi1+1 · · · Bi1−1
bi1+2 | · · · Bi1−1 · · · Bi1+1 · · · Bi1+2 · · ·
Note that Bi1−1 appears ahead of Bi1+1 on bi1+2’s list as the lists of bi1+1 and bi1+2 are
reverses of each other.
Similarly, (Bi1−1, bi1+2) must not be a blocking pair to the stable pairs (Bi1−1, bi1) and
(Bi1+1, bi1+2). Since Bi1−1 is ahead of Bi1+1 on bi1+2’s preference list, bi1+2 has to appear
after bi1 on Bi1−1’s preference list to prevent (Bi1−1, bi1+2) from becoming a blocking pair.
The preference lists of Bi1−2, Bi1−1 and Bi1 are as follows.
Bi1−2 | · · · bi1 · · · bi1−2 · · · bi1−1 · · · bi1+1
Bi1−1 | · · · bi1+1 · · · bi1−1 · · · bi1 · · · bi1+2 · · ·
Bi1 | · · · bi1+2 · · · bi1 · · · bi1+1 · · ·
Note that bi1+2 appears ahead of bi1 on Bi1 ’s list as the lists of Bi1−1 and Bi1 are reverses
of each other. This contradicts the relative order of the women on lists of men Bj with j
even since bi1 should be first.
Hence, the size of any rotation is 2. 
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Lemma 19 In the 1-attribute model, every man (and woman) participates in at most one
rotation.
Proof: Suppose man B1 participates in more than one rotation. Starting with his
partner in the male-optimal matching, man B1 goes down his preference list with each
rotation he participates in. Suppose b1 is the partner of B1 in the male-optimal matching,
and b2 and b3 are partners of B1 after the first and second rotations, respectively, that
involve B1. Let B2 and B3 be the partners of b2 and b3 when they participate in the
respective rotations with B1. The preference lists of B1, B2, B3, b1, b2, and b3 are as
follows.
B1 | · · · b1 · · · b2 · · · b3 · · ·
B2 | · · · b2 · · · b1 · · ·
B3 | · · · b3 · · · b2 · · ·
b1 | · · · B2 · · · B1 · · ·
b2 | · · · B3 · · · B1 · · · B2
b3 | · · · B1 · · · B3 · · ·
We note that B2 and B3 have the same preference lists and B1 has the reverse preference
list. Hence, their preference lists appear as follows.
B1 | · · · b1 · · · b2 · · · b3 · · ·
B2 | · · · b3 · · · b2 · · · b1 · · ·
B3 | · · · b3 · · · b2 · · · b1
Similarly, b1 and b3 have the same preference lists and b2 has the reverse preference list.
Hence, their preference lists are as follows.
b1 | · · · B2 · · · B1 · · · B3
b2 | · · · B3 · · · B1 · · · B2
b3 | · · · B2 · · · B1 · · · B3 · · ·
When B1 and B2 participate in the rotation, their partners are b1 and b2 respectively.
This implies that (B2, b2) is a stable pair and is part of a stable matching. Hence, the
pair (B2, b3) cannot be a blocking pair. For (B2, b3) to be not a blocking pair, b3 should
be married to someone higher than B2 on her list, say Bx. In other words, b3 should
be married to Bx before the rotation involving B1 and B2 occurs and cannot to married
to anyone lower than Bx after the rotation has occurred because b3 can only go up her
preference list after future rotations.
b3 | · · · Bx · · · B2 · · · B1 · · · B3 · · ·
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This implies that b3 can never be married to B1 or B3 in the future, and the rotation
involving the pairs (B1, b2) and (B3, b3) which happens after the rotation involving B1 and
B2 violates that. Hence, any man (and woman) can participate in at most one rotation. 
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 16, which we repeat here.
Theorem 16 In the 1-attribute model, the rotation poset of a stable matching instance is
(isomorphic to) a path.
Proof: In order to prove this theorem, we need to show that any two rotations are
comparable, as this gives a total ordering on the set of rotations.
We start by computing the male-optimal and female-optimal stable matchings. The
men who have the same partner in both matchings are removed along with their partners
from the problem instance as their presence or absence does not affect the rotation poset.
So we may assume that every man and women in the stable matching instance is involved
in at least one rotation.
Since every rotation involves exactly two men and two women (Lemma 18), and, by
removing the men and women that are not involved in any rotations, we see that each
man and woman that remains is involved in exactly one rotation (Lemma 19). Thus, the
number of men and women in the (reduced) matching instance must be even.
Let the 2k men be denoted {B1, . . . , B2k} and the 2k women be denoted {b1, . . . , b2k}.
By relabeling, we can assume that the male-optimal matching pairs man Bi with woman
bi, and the female-optimal matching pairs man B2i−1 with woman b2i, and man B2i with
woman b2i−1. In other words, there are k rotations R1, R2, · · · , Rk and rotation Ri is of the
form {(B2i−1, b2i−1), (B2i, b2i)}. We want to show that any two rotations are comparable,
i.e., for every i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, where i 6= j, either Ri precedes Rj or Rj precedes Ri.
Let us compare two rotations, say R1 and R2. The men and women involved in the two
rotations are {B1, B2, B3, B4} and {b1, b2, b3, b4}.
The preference list of B2 is the reverse of B1’s and that of B3’s is reverse of B4’s.
Without loss of generality, we could assume that B1 and B3 have the same preference lists
and that b3 comes ahead of b1 on their preference lists. Therefore, the partial preference
lists of the men appear as follows.
B1 | · · · b3 · · · b1 · · · b2 · · ·
B2 | · · · b2 · · · b1 · · · b3
B3 | · · · b3 · · · b4 · · ·
B4 | · · · b4 · · · b3 · · ·
The partial preference lists of the women are given below.
b1 | · · · B2 · · · B1 · · ·
b2 | · · · B1 · · · B2 · · ·
b3 | · · · B4 · · · B3 · · ·
b4 | · · · B3 · · · B4 · · ·
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The pair (B1, b3) must not be a blocking pair to the male-optimal matching that pairs
Bi to bi. Since b3 appears ahead of b1 on B1’s preference list, B1 should appear after B3
on b3’s preference list. Therefore, the women’s partial preference lists are as follows.
b1 | · · · B2 · · · B1 · · ·
b2 | · · · B1 · · · B2 · · ·
b3 | · · · B4 · · · B3 · · · B1
b4 | · · · B1 · · · B3 · · · B4 · · ·
Since the female-optimal matching pairs (B2i−1, b2i) and (B2i, b2i−1), the pair (B1, b4)
cannot be a blocking pair. Since B1 appears ahead of B3 on b4’s preference list, b4 should
appear after b2 on B1’s preference list. So the men’s partial preference lists are as follows.
B1 | · · · b3 · · · b1 · · · b2 · · · b4
B2 | · · · b4 · · · b2 · · · b1 · · · b3
B3 | · · · b3 · · · b1 · · · b2 · · · b4
B4 | · · · b4 · · · b2 · · · b1 · · · b3
Since the male-optimal matching pairs (Bi, bi), we see that (B2, b4) cannot be a blocking
pair. Since b4 appears ahead of b2 on B2’s preference list, B2 should appear after B4 on
b4’s preference list. This gives us more information about the women’s partial preference
lists.
b1 | · · · B2 · · · B4 · · · B3 · · · B1
b2 | · · · B1 · · · B3 · · · B4 · · · B2
b3 | · · · B2 · · · B4 · · · B3 · · · B1
b4 | · · · B1 · · · B3 · · · B4 · · · B2
Comparing the preference lists for the men and the women, we observe that in the
men’s preference lists the women involved in one rotation are sandwiched by the women of
the other rotation. A similar thing happens in the women’s preference lists, except that the
rotations reverse their roles here, i.e. if the women from rotation R sandwich the women
from rotation R′ in the men’s preference lists, then the men from R′ sandwich the men
from R in the women’s preference lists. Since this is true for the men and women in every
pair of rotations, we could assume that all odd men have b1 and b2 as the innermost pair,
enveloped by b3 and b4 and so on. In other words, the preference lists for the men are as
follows.
B1 | b2k−1 b2k−3 · · · b3 b1 b2 b4 · · · b2k−2 b2k
B2 | b2k b2k−2 · · · b4 b2 b1 b3 · · · b2k−3 b2k−1
B3 | b2k−1 b2k−3 · · · b3 b1 b2 b4 · · · b2k−2 b2k
...
...
...
B2k−2 | b2k b2k−2 · · · b4 b2 b1 b3 · · · b2k−3 b2k−1
B2k−1 | b2k−1 b2k−3 · · · b3 b1 b2 b4 · · · b2k−2 b2k
B2k | b2k b2k−2 · · · b4 b2 b1 b3 · · · b2k−3 b2k−1
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This fixes the preference lists for the women and they are as follows.
b1 | B2 B4 · · · B2k−2 B2k B2k−1 B2k−3 · · · B3 B1
b2 | B1 B3 · · · B2k−3 B2k−1 B2k B2k−2 · · · B4 B2
b3 | B2 B4 · · · B2k−2 B2k B2k−1 B2k−3 · · · B3 B1
...
...
...
b2k−2 | B1 B3 · · · B2k−3 B2k−1 B2k B2k−2 · · · B4 B2
b2k−1 | B2 B4 · · · B2k−2 B2k B2k−1 B2k−3 · · · B3 B1
b2k | B1 B3 · · · B2k−3 B2k−1 B2k B2k−2 · · · B4 B2
Suppose 1 ≤ i < k. Recall that Ri is of the form {(B2i−1, b2i−1), (B2i, b2i)} and Ri+1 is
{(B2i+1, b2i+1), (B2i+2, b2i+2)}. Now Ri moves b2i−1 from B2i−1, which is below B2i+1 on its
preference list to B2i, which is above B2i+1 on its preference list. Hence the rotation Ri
eliminates the pair (B2i+1, b2i−1). Also, Ri+1 moves B2i+1 to b2i+2, which is strictly worse
for B2i+1 than b2i−1. Thus, Ri explicitly precedes Ri+1 (taking M = B2i+1 and w = b2i−1
in Definition 3.6).

6 Stable matchings in the k-Euclidean model
Having given our construction for the k-attribute setting, we now turn to the k-Euclidean
model. We remind the reader that in this model every man, say Ai, is associated with two
points in Rk. One of the points, A¯i, denotes his position and the other, Aˆi, denotes the
position of his ideal partner. We refer to A¯i as the position point of Ai and to Aˆi as the
preference point of Ai. Similarly, each women has her own position and preference points.
Each man ranks the women based on the Euclidean distance between his own preference
point and the women’s position points. In other words, if the distance between Aˆi and b¯ is
less than the distance between Aˆi and c¯, then Ai prefers b over c (b appears higher in his
preference list than c).
In this section we work in the 2-dimensional Euclidean model. Our goal here is to
establish Theorem 3, which we repeat below.
Theorem 3 #BIS ≡AP #SM(k−Euclidean) when k ≥ 2.
Theorem 3 asserts that #BIS and #SM(k-Euclidean) are AP-interreducible for k ≥
2. Since the AP-reduction from #SM(k-Euclidean) to #BIS follows easily from known
results (see Section 3.5), we now give an AP-reduction from #BIS to #SM(k-Euclidean).
As in Section 4, we will show how to take an instance G of #BIS and, in polynomial
time, construct an instance I of #SM(k-Euclidean) so that the number of stable matchings
of I is equal to the number of independent sets of G.
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Let G = (V1 ∪ V2, E) be an instance of #BIS with |E| = n. We will construct a
2-Euclidean stable matching instance having 3n men and 3n women. Our construction
will use the ρ-cycles and σ-cycles defined in Section 4.1.1 . To specify the stable matching
instance, we now give position and preference points for the 3n men and women.
First, we position the 3n women a1, · · · , an, b1, · · · , bn, c1, · · · , cn such that the b-women
lie on the y-axis and the a-women and c-women lie on the x-axis. We represent woman wi by
w¯i = (w¯i(x), w¯i(y)) where w¯i(x) and w¯i(y) are her x- and y-coordinates. The coordinates
of a¯i, b¯i and c¯i are (a¯i(x), 0), (0, b¯i(y)) and (c¯i(x), 0), respectively. We impose further
restrictions on the coordinates of a¯i, b¯i, and c¯i.
Let b¯ρi(y) = a¯i(x), c¯σ−1i(x) = a¯i(x)− 0.7 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Fixing the x-coordinates of a¯1, . . . , a¯n therefore fixes the positions of all of the women.
Suppose D1 through Dl are the l cycles of σ of lengths p1 through pl, respectively. As
before, let ei be a representative element of cycle Di. So Di = {ei, σ(ei), . . . , σ
pi−1(ei)}.
Also as before, let Rep(σ) = {e1, e2 · · · , el} be the set of representative elements of the
σ-cycles.
Let Wi = {ax : x ∈ Di} ∪ {cx : x ∈ Di}. We set p0 = 0. For woman aσhej , where
ej ∈ Rep(σ), and 0 ≤ h ≤ pj − 1, we set a¯σhej(x) =
∑j−1
i=0 2pi + h+ 1. The position points
of the women are as follows.
For ej ∈ Rep(σ), 0 ≤ h ≤ pj − 1 let
a¯σhej =
(
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1 , 0
)
,
b¯ρσhej =
(
0 ,
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1
)
, and
c¯σ(h−1)ej =
(
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.3 , 0
)
.
Next we fix the locations in the x-y plane for the ideal partners of the men as follows,
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i.e. we specify the preference points for each man.
Let ǫ = 1/100n.
For ej ∈ Rep(σ), 0 ≤ h ≤ pj − 1 let
Aˆσhej =
(
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1 ,
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ
)
,
Bˆσhej =
(
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1 , 1000
n
)
, and
Cˆσ(h−1)ej =
(
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 0.6 , 0
)
.
Having fixed the position of the women and the preference points for the men, we next
fix the position of the men and the preference points of the women.
First, we position the 3n men A1, · · · , An, B1, · · · , Bn, C1, · · · , Cn such that the C-men
lie on the y-axis and the A-men and B-men lie on the x-axis. We represent man mi by
M¯i = (M¯i(x), M¯i(y)) where M¯i(x) and M¯i(y) are his x- and y-coordinates. The coordinates
of A¯i, B¯i and C¯i are (A¯i(x), 0), (B¯i(x), 0) and (0, C¯i(y)), respectively. We impose further
restrictions on the coordinates of A¯i, B¯i, and C¯i.
Let B¯i(x) = C¯i(y), A¯ρ−1i(x) = B¯i(x)− 0.7 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Here again, fixing the x-coordinates of B¯1, . . . , B¯n therefore fixes the positions of all of
the men. Suppose E1 through Ek are the k cycles of ρ of lengths q1 through qk, respectively.
As before, let fi be a representative element of cycle Ei, which is the element of Ei with
the smallest index. So Ei = {fi, ρ(fi), . . . , ρ
qi−1(fi)} = {fi, fi + 1, . . . , fi + qi − 1}. Also as
before, let Rep(ρ) = {f1, f2 · · · , fk} be the set of representative elements of the ρ-cycles.
Let Wi = {Bx : x ∈ Ei} ∪ {Ax : x ∈ Ei}. We set q0 = 0. For man Bρhfj , where
fj ∈ Rep(ρ), and 0 ≤ h ≤ qj − 1, we set B¯ρhfj (x) =
∑j−1
i=0 2qi + h+ 1. The position points
of the men are as follows.
For fj ∈ Rep(ρ), 0 ≤ h ≤ qj − 1 let
A¯ρh−1fj =
(
j−1∑
i=0
2qi + h + 0.3 , 0
)
,
B¯ρhfj =
(
j−1∑
i=0
2qi + h + 1 , 0
)
, and
C¯ρhfj =
(
0 ,
j−1∑
i=0
2qi + h + 1
)
.
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Next we fix the locations in the x-y plane for the ideal partners of the women as follows,
i.e. we specify the preference points for each woman.
Let ǫ = 1/100n.
For fj ∈ Rep(ρ), 0 ≤ h ≤ qj − 1
let aˆρhfj =
(
j−1∑
i=0
2qi + h+ 1 , 1000
n
)
,
bˆρhfj =
(
j−1∑
i=0
2qi + h+ 0.6 , 0
)
, and
cˆρhfj =
(
j−1∑
i=0
2qi + h+ 1 ,
j−1∑
i=0
2qi + h+ 1− ǫ
)
.
Having assigned position and preference points for both the men and the women, we
construct the initial part of the preference lists of the men starting with man Cσ(h−1)ej .
We compare the distances of the women from Cˆσ(h−1)ej to produce the initial part of the
preference list.
ej , em ∈ Rep(σ) , 0 ≤ f, h ≤ pj − 1 , 0 ≤ g ≤ pm − 1
d2(Cˆσ(h−1)ej , b¯ρσgem) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6− 0)
2
+ (0−
m−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1)
2 ≥ 0.62 + 12 = 1.36
d2(Cˆσ(h−1)ej , c¯σ(h−1)ej ) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6
−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − h− 0.3)
2 + (0− 0)2 = 0.09 and
d2(Cˆσ(h−1)ej , a¯σhej ) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6
−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − h− 1)
2 + (0− 0)2 = 0.16.
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For h 6= f ,
d2(Cˆσ(h−1)ej , c¯σ(f−1)ej ) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − f − 0.3)
2 + (0− 0)2
≥ (|h− f | − 0.3)2 ≥ (1− 0.3)2 = 0.49 and
d2(Cˆσ(h−1)ej , a¯σ(f)ej ) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − f − 1)
2 + (0− 0)2
≥ (|h− f | − 0.4)2 ≥ (1− 0.4)2 = 0.36.
For m > j,
d2(Cˆσ(h−1)ej , c¯σ(g−1)em) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6−
m−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3)
2 + (0− 0)2
≥ (|
m−1∑
i=j
2pi + g| − |h+ 0.3|)
2
≥ (2pj − (pj − 1)− 0.3)
2 ≥ (2− 0.3)2 = 2.89 and
d2(Cˆσ(h−1)ej , a¯σgem) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6−
m−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1)
2 + (0− 0)2
≥ (|
m−1∑
i=j
2pi + g + 0.4| − |h|)
2
≥ (2pj + 0.4− (pj − 1))
2 ≥ 2.42 = 5.76.
For j > m,
d2(Cˆσ(h−1)ej , c¯σ(g−1)em) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6−
m−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3)
2 + (0− 0)2
≥ (|
j−1∑
i=m
2pi + h+ 0.3| − |g|)
2
≥ (2pm + 0.3− (pm − 1))
2 ≥ 2.32 = 5.29 and
d2(Cˆσ(h−1)ej , a¯σgem) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6−
m−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1)
2 + (0− 0)2
≥ (|
j−1∑
i=m
2pi + h| − |g + 0.4|)
2
≥ (2pm − (pm − 1)− 0.4)
2 ≥ (1.6)2 = 2.56.
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From the above analysis, it follows that the preference list of Cσ(h−1)ej starts with
cσ(h−1)ejaσhej for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, 0 ≤ h ≤ pj − 1 as in Section 4.1.3.
Now we carry out a similar analysis to determine the initial part of the preference list
of Aσhej . We note that
∑l
i=1 2pi = 2n and 2ǫ · 2n =
4n
100n
≤ 0.04. This implies that in the
following analysis we could upper bound the term 2ǫ · (
∑j
i=1(2pi) + h+ 1) by 0.04.
ǫ = 1/100n , ej , em ∈ Rep(σ) , 0 ≤ f, h ≤ pj − 1 , 0 ≤ g ≤ pm − 1
d2(Aˆσhej , a¯σhej) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − h− 1)
2
+ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ− 0)
2
= (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ)
2
d2(Aˆσhej , b¯ρσhej ) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− 0)
2
+ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1− ǫ−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − h− 1)
2
= (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1)
2 + ǫ2
d2(Aˆσhej , c¯σh−1ej) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − h− 0.3)
2
+ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1− ǫ− 0)
2
= 0.72 + (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1− ǫ)
2
= (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ)
2 + 0.49
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1)
2 + ǫ2 + 0.45
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For h 6= f ,
d2(Aˆσhej , a¯σf ej ) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − f − 1)
2
+ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1− ǫ− 0)
2
= (h− f)2 + (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ)
2
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ)
2 + 1
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1)
2 + ǫ2 + 0.96
d2(Aˆσhej , b¯ρσf ej) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1− 0)
2
+ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − f − 1)
2
= (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1)
2 + (h− f − ǫ)2
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1)
2 + (1− ǫ)2
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1)
2 + ǫ2 + 0.98
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d2(Aˆσhej , c¯σf−1ej) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − f − 0.3)
2
+ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ− 0)
2
= (h− f − 0.7)2 + (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ)
2
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1− ǫ)
2 + 0.09
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1)
2 + ǫ2 + 0.05
For m > j,
d2(Aˆσhej , a¯σgem) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
m−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1)
2
+ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1− ǫ− 0)
2
≥ (|
m−1∑
i=j
2pi + g| − |h|)
2 + (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1− ǫ)
2
≥ (2pj − (pj − 1))
2 + (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1− ǫ)
2
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ)
2 + 4
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1)
2 + ǫ2 + 3.96
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d2(Aˆσhej , b¯ρσgem) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− 0)
2
+ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1− ǫ−
m−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1)
2
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1)
2 + (|
m−1∑
i=j
2pi + g + ǫ| − |h|)
2
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1)
2 + (2pj + ǫ− (pj − 1))
2
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1)
2 + (2 + ǫ)2
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1)
2 + ǫ2 + 4
d2(Aˆσhej , c¯σg−1em) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1−
m−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3)
2
+ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ− 0)
2
≥ (|
m−1∑
i=j
2pi + g| − |h+ 0.7|)
2 + (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1− ǫ)
2
≥ (2pj − (pj − 1)− 0.7)
2 + (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ)
2
≥ (2− 0.7)2 + (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ)
2
= (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1− ǫ)
2 + 1.69
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1)
2 + ǫ2 + 1.65
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For j > m,
d2(Aˆσhej , a¯σgem) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1−
m−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1)
2
+ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ− 0)
2
≥ (|
j−1∑
i=m
2pi + h| − |g|)
2 + (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ)
2
≥ (2pm − (pm − 1))
2 + (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ)
2
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1− ǫ)
2 + 4
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1)
2 + ǫ2 + 3.96
d2(Aˆσhej , b¯ρσgem) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1− 0)
2
+ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ−
m−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1)
2
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1)
2 + (|
j−1∑
i=m
2pi + h| − |g + ǫ|)
2
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1)
2 + (2pm − (pm − 1)− ǫ)
2
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1)
2 + (2− ǫ)2
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1)
2 + ǫ2 + 3.96
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d2(Aˆσhej , c¯σg−1em) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
m−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3)
2
+ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ− 0)
2
≥ (|
j−1∑
i=m
2pi + h+ 0.7| − |g|)
2 + (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ)
2
≥ (2pm − (pm − 1) + 0.7)
2 + (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ)
2
≥ (2 + 0.7)2 + (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ)
2
= (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ǫ)
2 + 7.29
≥ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1)
2 + ǫ2 + 7.25
From the above analysis, it follows that the preference list of Aσhej starts with aσhejbρσhej
for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, 0 ≤ h ≤ pj − 1 as in Section 4.1.3.
Last, we study the preference list of Bσhej . First we will show that the preference list
of man Bσhej , where 1 ≤ j ≤ l, 0 ≤ h ≤ pj − 1, starts with
bρσ(pl−1)elbρσ(pl−2)el · · · bρelbρσ(pl−1−1)el−1 · · · bρel−1 · · · bρσ(p1−1)e1 · · · bρe1 .
We obtain the above preference list by comparing distances between Bˆσhej and the positions
of the women.
ej , ek ∈ Rep(σ), 0 ≤ h ≤ pj − 1 , 0 ≤ f ≤ pk − 1
d2(Bˆσhej , b¯ρσf ek) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1− 0)
2 + (1000n −
k−1∑
i=0
2pi − f − 1)
2
≤ (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1)
2 + (1000n − 1)2 < (1000n)2
d2(Bˆσhej , a¯σf ek) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
k−1∑
i=0
2pi − f − 1)
2 + (1000n − 0)2
≥ (1000n)2
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d2(Bˆσhej , c¯σf−1ek) = (
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
k−1∑
i=0
2pi − f − 0.3)
2 + (1000n − 0)2
≥ (1000n)2
It immediately follows that the b-women are all closer to Bˆσhej than any of the a-women
or c-women. Hence, the preference list of Bσhej would start with all the b-women coming
first. We also note that the b-women all have their x-component set to 0. Hence, Bσhej
would rank the b-women by measuring their distance from Bˆσhej in the y-component. We
also note that 1000n − 2n > 0 for n ≥ 1. Next we compare distances between Bˆσhej and
the b-women only using the y-component. We will use the notation dy(·, ·) to denote the
distance in the y-component.
ej , ek1, ek2 ∈ Rep(σ) , 0 ≤ h ≤ pj − 1 , 0 ≤ g ≤ pk1 − 1 , 0 ≤ f ≤ pk2 − 1
For k1 = k2 and g > f , we have
dy(Bˆσhej , b¯ρσgek1 ) = 1000
n −
k1−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1 < 1000
n −
k1−1∑
i=0
2pi − f − 1
= 1000n −
k2−1∑
i=0
2pi − f − 1 = dy(Bˆσhej , b¯ρσf ek2 ).
For k1 > k2, we have
dy(Bˆσhej , b¯ρσf ek2 )− dy(Bˆσhej , b¯ρσgek1 ) = (1000
n −
k2−1∑
i=0
2pi − f − 1)
− (1000n −
k1−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1)
=
k1−1∑
i=0
2pi + g −
k2−1∑
i=0
2pi − f =
k1−1∑
i=k2
2pi + g − f
≥ 2pk2 + g − (pk2 − 1) = pk2 + 1 + g > 0.
From the above discussion, it follows that the preference list of Bσhej starts with
bρσ(pl−1)elbρσ(pl−2)el · · · bρelbρσ(pl−1−1)el−1 · · · bρel−1 · · · bρσ(p1−1)e1 · · · bρe1 .
Next we compare the distances of a-women and c-women from Bˆσhej . As a-women and
c-women all have their y-component set to 0, Bσhej would rank the b-women by measuring
their distance from Bˆσhej in the x-component. We will use the notation dx(·, ·) to denote
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the distance in the x-component. We consider two cases (i) h 6= pi − 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, (ii)
h = pi − 1, for some i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , l}.
Case(i) h 6= pi − 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ l: Now we compute and compare the distances between
Bˆσhej and the a-women and the c-women.
ej, ek ∈ Rep(σ) , 0 ≤ h ≤ pj − 2 , 0 ≤ g ≤ pk − 1 ,
For k = j and g = h, we have
dx(Bˆσhej , a¯σgek) = dx(Bˆσhej , a¯σhej )
= |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − h− 1| = 0 and
dx(Bˆσhej , c¯σgek) = dx(Bˆσhej , c¯σhej )
= |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − (h + 1)− 0.3| = 0.3.
For k = j and g /∈ {h, pj − 1}, we have
dx(Bˆσhej , a¯σgek) = dx(Bˆσhej , a¯σgej )
= |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1| = |h− g| ≥ 1 and
dx(Bˆσhej , c¯σgek) = dx(Bˆσhej , c¯σgej )
= |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1− 0.3| ≥ ||h− g| − 0.3| ≥ 0.7.
For k = j and g = pj − 1, we have
dx(Bˆσhej , a¯σgek) = dx(Bˆσhej , a¯σpj−1ej )
= |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − (pj − 1)− 1|
= |h− (pj − 1)| ≥ 1 (because h 6= pj − 1) and
dx(Bˆσhej , c¯σgek) = dx(Bˆσhej , c¯σpj−1ej) = dx(Bˆσhej , c¯σ−1ej )
= |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h + 1−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − 0.3| ≥ |h+ 0.7| ≥ 0.7.
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For k > j we have
dx(Bˆσhej , a¯σgek) = |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
k−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1|
= |
k−1∑
i=j
2pi + g − h|
≥ |2pj + g − (pj − 1)| ≥ |pj + 1 + g| ≥ 2 and
dx(Bˆσhej , c¯σg−1ek) = |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
k−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3|
= |
k−1∑
i=j
2pi + g − h− 0.7|
≥ |2pj + g − (pj − 1)− 0.7| ≥ |pj + 1 + g − 0.7| ≥ 1.3.
For k < j we have
dx(Bˆσhej , a¯σgek) = |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
k−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1| = |
j−1∑
i=k
2pi + h− g|
≥ |2pk + h− (pk − 1)| ≥ |pk + 1 + h| ≥ 2 and
dx(Bˆσhej , c¯σg−1ek) = |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
k−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3| = |
j−1∑
i=k
2pi + h+ 0.7− g|
≥ |2pk + h + 0.7− (pk − 1)| ≥ |pk + 1.7 + h| ≥ 2.7.
It follows from the comparison that Bσhej prefers aσhej over cσhej and cσhej over any other
a-woman and the c-woman. Hence, the initial part of the preference list of Bσhej reads
bρσ(pl−1)elbρσ(pl−2)el · · · bρelbρσ(pl−1−1)el−1 · · · bρel−1 · · · bρσ(p1−1)e1 · · · bρe1aσhejcσhej .
Case(ii) h = pi− 1, for some i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , l}: Now we compare the distances between
Bˆσhej and the a-women and the c-women.
ej , ek ∈ Rep(σ), h = pj − 1, 0 ≤ g ≤ pk − 1,
For k = j and g = h, we have
dx(Bˆσhej , a¯σgek) = dx(Bˆσpj−1ej , a¯σpj−1ej )
= |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − h− 1| = 0 and
dx(Bˆσhej , c¯σgek) = dx(Bˆσpj−1ej , c¯σpj−1ej ) = dx(Bˆσpj−1ej , c¯σ−1ej)
= |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + pj −
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − 0.3| = pj − 0.3.
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For k > j we have
dx(Bˆσpj−1ej , a¯σgek) = |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + pj −
k−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1|
= |
k−1∑
i=j
2pi + g + 1− pj| ≥ |2pj + g + 1− pj |
≥ |pj + 1 + g| ≥ pj + 1 and
dx(Bˆσhej , c¯σg−1ek) = |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + pj −
k−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3|
= |
k−1∑
i=j
2pi + g + 0.3− pj| ≥ |2pj + g + 0.3− pj|
≥ |pj + 0.3 + g| ≥ pj + 0.3.
For k < j we have
dx(Bˆσpj−1ej , a¯σgek) = |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + pj −
k−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1|
= |
j−1∑
i=k
2pi + pj − g − 1| ≥ |2pk + pj − pk|
≥ |pk + pj | ≥ pj + 1 and
dx(Bˆσhej , c¯σg−1ek) = |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + pj −
k−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3|
= |
j−1∑
i=k
2pi + pj − g − 0.3| ≥ |2pk + pj − (pk − 1)− 0.3|
≥ |pk + pj + 0.7| ≥ pj + 1.7.
From the above inequalities, it follows that Bσhej prefers aσpj−1ej over cσ−1ej , and cσ−1ej over
a-women and c-women whose subscript belongs to σ cycles different from that of cσ−1ej ’s.
Now we compute and compare distances from Bˆσhej to all the a-women and c-women whose
subscript is on the same σ cycle as a
σ
pj−1ej
’s and cσ−1ej ’s.
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For 0 ≤ g ≤ pj − 2 we have
dx(Bˆσpj−1ej , c¯σgej)− dx(Bˆσpj−1ej , a¯σgej)
= |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + pj −
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1− 0.3| − |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + pj −
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1|
= pj − g − 1.3− (pj − g − 1) < 0
and for 0 ≤ g ≤ pj − 1 we have
dx(Bˆσpj−1ej , a¯σgej)− dx(Bˆσpj−1ej , c¯σg−1ej)
= |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + pj −
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 1| − |
j−1∑
i=0
2pi + pj −
j−1∑
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3|
= pj − g − 1− (pj − g − 0.3) < 0.
From the above comparisons, it follows that B
σ
pj−1ej
prefers a
σ
pj−1ej
over c
σ
pj−2ej
, cσgej over
aσgej and aσgej over cσg−1ej for 0 ≤ g ≤ pj − 2. Stringing these preferences together, we
obtain a portion of B
σ
pj−1ej
’s preference list which appears as
a
σ
pj−1ej
c
σ
pj−2ej
a
σ
pj−2ej
c
σ
pj−3ej
· · · cσejaσejcejaejcσ−1ej(= cσpj−1ej ).
We remind the reader that B
σ
pj−1ej
’s preference list has all the b-women appearing at
the front appended by the above list of a-women and c-women. Hence, the initial part of
B
σ
pj−1ej
’s preference list is
bρσ(pl−1)el · · · bρelbρσ(pl−1−1)el−1 · · · bρel−1 · · · bρσ(p1−1)e1 · · · bρe1
a
σ
(pj−1)ej
c
σ
(pj−2)ej
a
σ
(pj−2)ej
· · · cejaejcσ−1ej(= cσ(pj−1)ej ).
The initial part of the preference lists of men Aσsei, Cσs−1ei and Bσsei are as follows.
ei ∈ Rep(σ) ,
Aσmei : aσmeibρσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1
Cσ(m−1)ei : cσ(m−1)eiaσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1
Bσmei : bρσ(pl−1)el · · · bρelbρσ(pl−1−1)el−1 · · · bρel−1 · · ·
bρσ(p1−1)e1 · · · bρe1aσmeicσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 2
Bσ(pi−1)ei : bρσ(pl−1)el · · · bρelbρσ(pl−1−1)el−1 · · · bρel−1 · · · bρσ(p1−1)e1 · · · bρe1aσ(pi−1)cσ(pi−2)ei
aσ(pi−2)ei · · ·aσeiceiaeicσ(pi−1)ei
Note that these are exactly the same as those in (4) for any appropriate value of the
permutation τ . In a similar manner, we can obtain preference lists for the women. The
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preference lists for the women are as follows.
fi ∈ Rep(ρ) ,
bρmfi : Aρ(m−1)fiBρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1
cρmfi : BρmfiCρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1
aρmfi : Cρ(qk−1)fk · · ·CfkCρ(qk−1−1)fk−1 · · ·Cfk−1 · · ·
Cρ(q1−1)f1 · · ·Cf1BρmfiAρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 2
aρ(qi−1)fi : Cρ(qk−1)fk · · ·CfkCρ(qk−1−1)fk−1 · · ·Cfk−1Bρ(qi−1)fiAρ(qi−2)fi
Bρ(qi−2)fi · · ·BρfiAfiBfiAρ(qi−1)fi
Now note that, by the construction of the ρ cycles, which go in order from 1 to n, the
list
Cρ(qk−1)fk · · ·CfkCρ(qk−1−1)fk−1 · · ·Cfk−1 · · ·Cρ(q1−1)f1 · · ·Cf1
is identically Cn · · ·C1. Thus, the preference lists for the women are identical to those given
in (3). Thus, the rest of the proof is exactly the same as in the 3-attribute case, starting
from the introduction of the men’s lists (4) in Section 4.2.
References
[1] N. Bhatnagar, S. Greenberg, and D. Randall. Sampling stable marriages: why spouse-
swapping won’t work. Proc. 19th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algo-
rithms (SODA 2008), pp. 1223–1232.
[2] C. Blair. Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings. J. Combinatorial
Theory (A) 37 (1984), pp. 353–356.
[3] A. Bogomolnaia and J.-F. Laslier. Euclidean preferences. J. Mathematical Economics
43 (2007), pp. 87–98.
[4] Canadian Resident Matching Service.
http://www.carms.ca./eng/operations_algorithm_e.shtml
[5] V. Dalmau. Linear datalog and bounded path duality of relational structures. Logical
Methods in Computer Science, 1 (2005), pp. 1–32.
[6] B.A. Davey and H.A. Priestley. Introduction to Lattices and Order, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, 1990.
[7] M. Dyer, L.A. Goldberg, C. Greenhill, and M. Jerrum. The relative complexity of
approximate counting problems. Algorithmica 38 (2004), pp. 471–500.
58
[8] D. Gale and L.S. Shapley. College admissions and the stability of marriage. American
Mathematical Monthly 69 (1962), pp. 9–15.
[9] Q. Ge and D. Sˇtefankovicˇ. A graph polynomial for independent sets of bipartite
graphs. http://arxiv.org/abs/0911.4732, 2009.
[10] L.A. Goldberg and M. Jerrum. The complexity of ferromagnetic Ising with local fields.
Combinatorics, Probability & Computing, 16 (2007), pp. 43–61.
[11] L.A. Goldberg and M. Jerrum. Approximating the partition function
of the ferromagnetic Potts model. http://arxiv.org/abs/1002.0986, 2010.
[12] L.A. Goldberg and M. Jerrum. Counterexample to rapid mixing of the GS Process,
technical note, March 2010.
[13] D. Gusfield. Three fast algorithms for four problems in stable marriage. SIAM J.
Computing 16 (1987), pp. 111–128.
[14] D. Gusfield and R.W. Irving. The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algortihms,
MIT Press, Boston, 1989.
[15] D. Gusfield, R.W. Irving, P. Leather, and M. Saks. Every finite distributive lattice is a
set of stable matchings for a small stable marriage instance, J. Combinatorial Theory
(A) 44 (1987), pp. 304–309.
[16] R.W. Irving and P. Leather. The complexity of counting stable marriages, SIAM J.
Computing 15 (1986), pp. 655–667.
[17] M.R. Jerrum, L.G. Valiant, and V.V Vazirani. Random generation of combinatorial
structures from a uniform distribution. Threoretical Computer Science 43 (1986), pp.
169–188.
[18] D.E. Knuth. Stable Marriage and its Relation to Other Combinatorial Problems. Amer-
ican Mathematical Society, Providence, 1997 (English edition).
[19] D. McVitie and L. Wilson. The stable marriage problem. Communications of the ACM
14 (1971), pp. 486–490.
[20] National Resident Matching Program.
http://www.nrmp.org./res_match/about_res/algorithms.html
[21] J.S. Provan and M.O. Ball. The complexity of counting cuts and of computing the
probability that a graph is connected. SIAM J. Computing 12 (1983), pp. 777–788.
[22] Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme.
http://www.nes.scot.nhs.uk/sfas/About/default.asp
59
